United Nations S/2012/670

Security Council

Distr.: General
31 August 2012

Original: English

Identical letters dated 23 August 2012 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Upon instructions from my Government, and following my letters dated 16 to 20 and 23 to 25 April, 7, 11, 14 to 16, 18, 21, 24, 29 and 31 May, 1, 4, 6, 7, 11, 19, 20, 25, 27 and 28 June, 2, 3, 9, 11, 13, 16, 17 and 24 July and 1, 2, 8, 10, 14, 15, 16 and 23 August 2012, I have the honour to attach herewith a detailed list of violations of cessation of violence which have been committed by armed groups in Syria from Wednesday evening, 15 August 2012, until Thursday evening, 16 August 2012 (see annex).

It would be highly appreciated if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

12-49681 (E) 050912 060912

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Annex to the identical letters dated 23 August 2012 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

[Original: Arabic]

A. Violations committed by armed terrorist groups between 2000 hours on 15 August 2012 and 2000 hours on 16 August 2012

	Place	*Time*	*Violations committed by armed terrorist groups and result thereof*
1.	Lebanese border	0400	Attempt to infiltrate from Lebanon into Syria in the Birat Aranah area. Shots were fired towards border guard personnel, one of whom was wounded.
2.		0400	Attempt to infiltrate from Lebanon into Syria. Shots were fired towards the Tarakas border guard forces position, wounding one man.
3.	Jordanian border	0145	Syrian border guard personnel came under fire.
4.		1600	Border guard personnel came under fire from inside Jordanian territory south of the village of Nada. Attempt to infiltrate into Syria.
5.	Damascus and Rif Dimashq	2100	Law enforcement forces came under fire in the Tall Manban region and five men were injured, including a captain.
6.		0200	Law enforcement forces came under fire in the Tall Manban region and Sergeant Husain Khalil and Conscript Ali Sulaiman were killed.
7.		0330	Law enforcement forces came under fire in the Qubban region and the Tishrin quarter. Three men were injured, including a second lieutenant.
8.		0500	A vehicle carrying law enforcement personnel came under fire on the Damascus-Homs highway, wounding one man and damaging the vehicle.
9.		0600	Border guard personnel came under fire. Conscript Ammar Ghandur was killed and three other men were injured.
10.		0730	Law enforcement forces came under fire in the Jisr Baghdad region. Two men were injured.
11.		0900	Law enforcement forces came under fire at the Qubban underpass. One man was injured.
12.		1130	Three law enforcement personnel were abducted in Mu'addamiyah al-Sham. The weapons of one man were stolen.
13.		1530	A law enforcement forces vehicle came under fire at the Jawbar turn-off on the southern ring road. Conscript Mahmud al-Sha'r was killed.

	Place	*Time*	*Violations committed by armed terrorist groups and result thereof*
14.	Dar'a and the surrounding countryside	1130	A vehicle, licence plate No. 441896, belonging to a civilian, Nathim al-Ghazali, was stopped and stolen in the vicinity of Jisr Namir in Qarfa.
15.		1145	Law enforcement forces came under fire in Tafas and one man was wounded.
16.		1230	Dr. Ma'mun Hamdi al-Zu'bi, the assistant to the Director of Health of Dar'a, was abducted.
17.		1300	A vehicle allocated to the road transport division of the Ministry of Transportation, licence plate No. 538789, was stolen.
18.		1400	Law enforcement forces came under fire in Majbal Qasyun. A civilian, Ahmad Ismail, was shot in the head.
19.		1500	A health service vehicle, licence plate No. 976675, was stopped and stolen in Azra'.
20.		1600	Law enforcement forces came under fire on the Khirbat Ghazalah-Dar'a road and two men were injured.
21.	Homs and the surrounding countryside	2130	Law enforcement personnel came under fire in the countryside surrounding Homs. Corporal Mahmud Zalat and Conscripts Imad Rami and Mustapha Ali were killed.
22.		1620	Law enforcement personnel came under fire in the Khalidiyah quarter of Homs. Conscript Salim Abdulrahman Maslu was killed.
23.		1700	Law enforcement personnel came under fire in Homs. Conscript Yassir Adnan Talawi was killed.
24.		0600	Law enforcement personnel came under fire in the Sultaniyah quarter and one man was injured.
25.	Hamah and the surrounding countryside	2145	Law enforcement personnel came under fire at the Sabuniyah roundabout and six men were injured.
26.		0800	There was intermittent firing in Suq al-Ghanam in Salmiyah. A civilian, Marwan Muhammad Dib, was killed.
27.		1030	An incendiary device was detonated on the Homs-Hamah highway in the vicinity of the Amin suburb. There were no casualties.
28.		1100	An incendiary device was detonated on the Muhradah-Hamah highway as a vehicle carrying law enforcement personnel was passing. Four men were injured.
29.		1200	A civilian, Tamim Mustapha, was attacked.
30.		1400	A vehicle owned by a civilian, Ala' Khuluf, licence plate No. 627264, was stolen in the Arba'in quarter.

	Place	*Time*	*Violations committed by armed terrorist groups and result thereof*
31.		1400	Law enforcement personnel came under fire in the Muhradah region. Sergeant Sa'ad Ibrahim and three conscripts, Hashim al-Jabir, Abdulsalam Isa and Mahir Hamud, were killed and six other men were injured, including an officer. One man was abducted and a vehicle was destroyed.
32.		1420	An incendiary device was detonated in the Ghab region as a law enforcement forces vehicle carrying food was passing. One man was wounded.
33.		1500	A civilian, Walid Mahmud Abu Safwah, was abducted in the village of Asharnah.
34.		1515	A vehicle, licence plate No. 832809, driven by a civilian, Amar al-Hilal, was stopped in the Hamidiyah quarter and stolen.
35.		1530	A vehicle belonging to the Directorate of Supply in Hamah was stopped and stolen in the Ba'th quarter.
36.		1615	A minibus belonging to the Directorate of Health in Hamah, licence plate No. 940307, was stolen and its civilian driver, Khalid Qusum, was abducted.
37.	Aleppo and the surrounding countryside	0700	Twenty incendiary devices were planted in the Saladin quarter.
38.		0830	Law enforcement personnel came under fire in the Saladin and Sayf al-Dawlah quarters. Three men were killed and 34 others were injured, including a captain and a lieutenant.
39.		1100	Law enforcement personnel came under fire at the Sayf al-Dawlah quarter junction of the Damascus road. Three men were killed and six others injured.
40.		1000	An incendiary device was detonated in Baron Street in Aleppo. One civilian was killed and two others injured.
41.		0100	The town of Nil came under attack from gunfire and mortar shells. Three civilians were killed and 40 others were injured.
42.	Idlib and the surrounding countryside	0600	A law enforcement forces patrol came under fire at the Idlib Ma'rat Masrin junction. Lieutenant Hisham As'ad was killed, another man was injured, Conscript Mahmud Hamud was abducted and a vehicle was stolen.
43.		0900	Civilian houses in the city of Idlib came under intermittent fire. Three civilians were killed and three others were injured.
44.		1015	Law enforcement personnel came under fire in the countryside surrounding Idlib. Two men, including a major, were killed.

	Place	*Time*	*Violations committed by armed terrorist groups and result thereof*
45.	Dayr al-Zawr	2200	Law enforcement personnel came under fire in the city of Dayr al-Zawr. Sergeant Ali al-Ali and Corporals Ali al-Nasir and Adnan Fandi were killed.
46.		0900	Law enforcement personnel came under fire as they were passing through the city of Dayr al-Zawr. Warrant Officer Manhal Uthman was killed and five men were injured.
47.		1700	Law enforcement personnel came under sniper fire at the Abu Kamal recruitment office. One man was injured.
48.		1730	Law enforcement personnel came under fire in the vicinity of the Abu Kamal broadcasting centre. One man was injured.
49.	Ladhiqiyah and the surrounding countryside	0600	Law enforcement personnel came under fire in the Haffah area. Private Muhammad Kan'an was killed.

B. Number of violations committed by armed terrorist groups between 15 and 16 August 2012

Killed		Wounded		Abducted		Armed men		Firing of weapons by armed persons against		Cases where law enforcement forces responded to fire	Explosive devices			Theft		Attempted infiltration by armed persons				Attacks, roadblocks and fires		Material damage	
Civilians	Law enforcement officers	Civilians	Law enforcement officers	Civilians	Law enforcement officers	Apprehended	Killed	Civilians	Law enforcement officers		Exploded	Defused	Exploded in manufacturing	Public	Private	Lebanon	Turkey	Iraq	Jordan	Civilian	Law enforcement	Public	Private
9	27	46	90	2	5	–	5	3	31	24	4	20	–	5	3	2	–	–	1	1	–	–	–

United Nations S/2012/671

Security Council

Distr.: General
23 August 2012

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 23 August 2012 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations stating that Mr. Philip Reed has been appointed alternate representative of the United Kingdom on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, that letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

12-47279 (E) 270812

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United Nations S/2012/672

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 August 2012

Original: English

Identical letters dated 27 August 2012 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

The Iranian regime's recent statements and actions mark a new phase in its war against the State of Israel and the Jewish people, which the international community can no longer ignore.

Over the past 18 months, Iran's terrorist activity targeting Israeli civilians and diplomats has been exposed in 24 countries and on five continents. The victims of its attacks include a busload of Israeli teenagers and families on vacation in Bulgaria; an Israeli diplomat on her way to pick up her children from school in Delhi; and many other innocent people — from Georgia to Thailand to Azerbaijan.

When Iran's United Nations representative wrote that the "Islamic Republic of Iran has no intention to attack any other nations" in a letter to the Security Council last week, he conveniently forgot to mention this systematic war of terror.

Iran's leaders have been very clear about their determination to wage a religious war against the State of Israel and the Jewish people. Anyone who holds doubts about this regime's intentions should review the flood of antisemitic and genocidal statements that the most senior leaders in Iran's government have issued this month.

Over the course of just a few days, Iran's Supreme Leader called Israel a "cancerous tumor in the heart of the Middle East"; its President called on "all human communities to wipe out [Israel] from the forehead of humanity"; and the head of its Aero-Space Forces threatened to "wipe [Israel] out of the map".

History shows that fanatics with the tools of State at their disposal should be taken at their word. One can only imagine what such an extremist regime would do if it got its hands on the world's most dangerous weapons.

Connecting the dots between Iran's statements and its actions should paint a very clear picture for the international community. A United Nations Member State that seeks to murder innocent civilians and diplomats; spreads vile antisemitism; and actively works to destroy another Member State should find no refuge in the good graces of the international community.

12-47378 (E) 290812

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Israel expects all responsible nations to immediately condemn the Iranian campaign of incitement and terrorism. It is time for the world to speak with one voice and act with common purpose to stop Iran before it is too late.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Ron **Prosor**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2012/673

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 August 2012

Original: English

France, Germany, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 1559 (2004), 1680 (2006), 1701 (2006), 1773 (2007), 1832 (2008), 1884 (2009), 1937 (2010) and 2004 (2011) as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon,

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon to extend the mandate of UNIFIL for a new period of one year without amendment presented in a letter from the Lebanese Foreign Minister to the Secretary-General of 21 July 2012 and welcoming the letter from the Secretary-General to its President of 14 August 2012 (S/2012/632) recommending this extension,

Reiterating its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon,

Reaffirming its commitment to the full implementation of all provisions of resolution 1701 (2006), and aware of its responsibilities to help secure a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution as envisioned in the resolution,

Calling upon all concerned parties to strengthen their efforts to fully implement all provisions of resolution 1701 (2006) without delay,

Expressing deep concern at all violations in connection with resolution 1701 (2006), and *looking forward* to the rapid finalization of UNIFIL's investigations with a view to preventing such violations in the future,

Welcoming the constructive role played by the tripartite mechanism in de-escalating tensions and *expressing its support* for the efforts of UNIFIL to engage with both parties to further develop liaison and coordination arrangements,

Emphasizing the importance of full compliance with the prohibition on sales and supply of arms and related materiel established by resolution 1701,

Recalling the utmost importance that all parties concerned respect the Blue Line in its entirety, *welcoming* the progress in the marking of the Blue line, and *encouraging* the parties to accelerate their efforts in coordination with UNIFIL to visibly mark the Blue Line in its entirety, as well as to move forward on the marking of its points of contention, as recommended by the Strategic Review,

12-47651 (E) 300812

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Condemning in the strongest terms the terrorist attack against UNIFIL peacekeepers on 9 December 2011, as well as all attempts to threaten the security and stability of Lebanon, *reaffirming* its determination to ensure that no such acts of intimidation will prevent UNIFIL from implementing its mandate in accordance with Security Council resolution 1701,

Recalling the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel,

Commending the active role and dedication of the personnel of UNIFIL and *expressing* its strong appreciation to Member States that contribute to UNIFIL and *underlining* the necessity that UNIFIL have at its disposal all necessary means and equipment to carry out its mandate,

Recalling the request from the Government of Lebanon to deploy an international force to assist it to exercise its authority throughout the territory and *reaffirming* UNIFIL's authority to take all necessary action in areas of operations of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind and to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its mandate,

Welcoming the efforts of the Secretary-General to keep all peacekeeping operations, including UNIFIL, under close review and *stressing the need* for the Council to pursue a rigorous, strategic approach to peacekeeping deployments,

Expressing its full support for the strategic priorities and recommendations identified by the Secretary-General in his letter of 12 March 2012 (S/2012/151) as a result of the Strategic Review of UNIFIL, and *requesting* the Secretary-General to continue updating the Council on the implementation of the Strategic Review,

Calling upon member States to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces as needed to enable it to perform its duties in line with resolution 1701,

Determining that the situation in Lebanon continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

1. *Decides* to extend the present mandate of UNIFIL until 31 August 2013;

2. *Commends* the positive role of UNIFIL, whose deployment together with the Lebanese Armed Forces has helped to establish a new strategic environment in southern Lebanon, *welcomes* the expansion of coordinated activities between UNIFIL and the Lebanese armed forces, and *calls for* further enhancement of this cooperation;

3. *Welcomes* in this regard the engagement of UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces in the Strategic dialogue which aims at carrying out analysis of ground forces and maritime assets and setting a series of benchmarks reflecting the correlation between the capacities and responsibilities of UNIFIL vis-à-vis those of the Lebanese Armed Forces, with a view to identifying Lebanese Armed Forces requirements for implementing tasks mandated in resolution 1701 (2006), *calls* for an acceleration of its pace, consistent with the relevant recommendations of the Strategic Review, including through enhancing the coordination amongst donors to provide assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces to enable it to fulfil its mandated tasks under resolution 1701 (2006);

4. *Strongly calls upon* all parties concerned to respect the cessation of hostilities, to prevent any violation of the Blue line and to respect it in its entirety and to cooperate fully with the United Nations and UNIFIL;

5. *Condemns* in the strongest terms all terrorist attacks against UNIFIL and *urges* all parties to abide scrupulously by their obligation to respect the safety of UNIFIL and other United Nations personnel and to ensure that the freedom of movement of UNIFIL is fully respected and unimpeded, in conformity with its mandate and its rules of engagement including by avoiding any course of action which endangers United Nations personnel, and in this regard, *calls* for further cooperation between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces in particular regarding coordinated and adjacent patrols, *welcomes* the commitment of the Lebanese authorities to bring to justice the perpetrators of the 27 May, 26 July and 9 December 2011 attacks and to protect UNIFIL movements and *reiterates its call* for the rapid finalization of the investigation launched by Lebanon regarding the 27 May, 26 July and 9 December 2011 attacks in order to bring to justice the perpetrators of these attacks;

6. *Urges* all parties to cooperate fully with the Security Council and the Secretary-General to make tangible progress towards a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution as envisioned in resolution 1701 (2006), and *emphasizes* that more work remains to be done by the parties to advance the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006);

7. *Urges* the Government of Israel to expedite the withdrawal of its army from northern Ghajar without further delay in coordination with UNIFIL, which has actively engaged Israel and Lebanon to facilitate such a withdrawal;

8. *Reaffirms* its call on all states to fully support and respect the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani River of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL;

9. *Welcomes* the efforts being undertaken by UNIFIL to implement the Secretary-General's zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to ensure full compliance of its personnel with the United Nations code of conduct, requests the Secretary-General to continue to take all necessary action in this regard and to keep the Security Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take preventive and disciplinary action to ensure that such acts are properly investigated and punished in cases involving their personnel;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to report to the Council on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006), every four months, or at any time as he deems appropriate;

11. *Stresses* the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003, and 1850 (2008) of 16 December 2008;

12. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

United Nations S/2012/674

Security Council

Distr.: General
29 August 2012

Original: English

Identical letters dated 28 August 2012 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

This week, Israel's children started their school year with the all-too-familiar sounds of sirens and explosions, as terrorists in Gaza fired six more rockets into their communities.

While Israel's schoolchildren were taking cover in bomb shelters, the United Nations released yet another biased report about Gaza. Apparently, the roar of rockets flying out of Gaza has not reached the deaf ears of the United Nations agencies that produced the report. They conveniently failed to mention that Hamas has brutally hijacked Gaza and deliberately targets Israeli civilians in relentless rocket attacks. A group of researchers on the moon could have easily produced a more balanced and accurate document about Gaza.

The truth is plain and simple: Hamas is responsible for the suffering in Gaza. Hamas is the real obstacle to peace and prosperity in our region. And it is high time for the Security Council and all other bodies of the United Nations to speak loudly and clearly against the violence that Hamas and other terrorists in Gaza continue to unleash on the children of our region, Israelis and Palestinians alike.

Israel expects the Security Council — and all responsible members of the international community — to condemn this campaign of terror without any further delay. How many more rockets must fall on the children of Israel before the Security Council utters a syllable?

Israel holds the Hamas terrorist organization fully responsible for all attacks emanating from Gaza. Israel will continue to exercise its right to self-defence, as appropriate, and will take all necessary measures to protect its citizens.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Ron **Prosor**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

12-47470 (E) 300812

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United Nations S/2012/675

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 August 2012

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2040 (2012), by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) for a 12-month period. The present report fulfils the requirement to outline steps that are currently being taken by UNSMIL, after the General National Congress elections, to engage with the Libyan authorities to ensure that it continues effectively to support Libya's specific needs with a view to reviewing and adjusting its mandate as necessary. The present report covers major developments since my report of 1 March 2012 (S/2012/129) and describes the activities undertaken by UNSMIL in line with its mandate under Security Council resolutions 2009 (2011), 2017 (2011), 2022 (2011) and 2040 (2012).

II. Political and security developments

2. In the wake of successful national elections, the National Transitional Council handed over its functions to a democratically elected General National Congress. Nevertheless, Libya continued to face serious political and security challenges, with a resurgence of several local conflicts and increased instability in the east, which will constitute early tests for the new national authorities.

3. The successful elections on 7 July 2012 marked a significant step forward for Libya in its democratic transition. Amid the constraints imposed by a compressed electoral timetable, a volatile security environment and lack of previous experience in electoral administration, the elections were a remarkable achievement. With turnout estimated at slightly in excess of 62 per cent, some 1.77 million voters participated in this historic event, in a general atmosphere of pride and enthusiasm.

4. While the registration and campaign periods proceeded largely without incident, the week preceding the polls was marked by violence, mostly in the east. Grievances regarding the allocation of seats in the General National Congress were considered to be the main reason for disrupting the elections. On 1 July, simultaneous violent demonstrations took place at the offices of the High National Election Commission in Benghazi and Tobruk. On 5 July, an arson attack on the district warehouse in Ajdabiya destroyed the electoral materials for 46 polling centres. The Commission took immediate steps to reprint ballot papers, while

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polling centres that were unable to open on time remained open late on election day or opened the following day. On 6 July, on the eve of polling, a Libyan air force helicopter transporting electoral materials was fired on near Benghazi, killing one Commission staff member and wounding another. Three other people died on polling day in election-related violence.

5. Several attacks on polling centres in the east on election day did not deter voters from casting their ballots. Concerns that instability in several areas, in particular in Kufra and the Nafusa mountains, would impede the successful holding of elections proved unfounded. In Kufra, negotiations produced an agreement to enable delayed voting at two remaining polling centres on 10 July. The High National Election Commission also put in place special measures to accommodate internally displaced Tawergha, Tuareg and Mashashiya voters.

6. Concerned at the political and security developments in the east, the National Transitional Council published an amendment to article 30 of the Constitutional Declaration on 5 July. If confirmed by the General National Congress, the amendment would replace the constitutional commission to be appointed by the Congress with an elected body, in which 20 members from each region would be elected locally.

7. After no history of political party culture in the past four decades, a proliferation of political entities emerged in the run-up to the elections. Those entities faced challenges throughout the electoral process in registering, building coalitions, recruiting party candidates (especially women), defining political platforms and obtaining some degree of name recognition. A spirit of goodwill infused the campaign period and political entities largely abided by the code of conduct that UNSMIL helped to facilitate. The full preliminary results were announced on 17 July and the final results on 1 August, after complaints and appeals had been adjudicated by the High National Election Commission and the courts. The results showed that the National Forces Alliance, headed by the former Chair of the Executive Office of the National Transitional Council, Mahmoud Jibril, won the proportional race with 39 of the 80 seats, with the Justice and Construction Party coming second with 17 seats. It remains to be seen if and how the 120 individual members elected in the majoritarian race will align themselves with entities or blocs in the Congress.

8. In other positive indications of Libya's democratic transition, successful local council elections were held in Azawiyah, Benghazi, Darnah and other cities. Local elections for Tripoli, originally scheduled for May, were postponed.

9. With the announcement of the election results on 1 August, the focus has shifted to the next steps in the transition. The National Transitional Council handed over its functions to the General National Congress on 8 August and was dissolved. The inaugural session of the Congress was held on 9 August, at which it elected the head of the National Front Party, Muhammad Yusuf al-Maqarif, as its President. The United Nations assisted with the preparations for the inaugural session. Meanwhile, the interim Government is preparing to hand over its functions to the successor Government, which, according to the Constitutional Declaration, is to be formed within one month of the first meeting of the Congress.

10. During the reporting period, several local conflicts and tensions that predated the revolution resurfaced, exacerbated by opposing allegiances during the revolution. Some have escalated into armed conflicts involving the use of heavy weaponry.

11. On 26 March, fighting erupted in Sabha, in the south of the country, between Tabu brigades and an Arab brigade, leaving 147 people dead and approximately 500 wounded. A Government delegation was dispatched to lead negotiations for a ceasefire and the Libyan authorities immediately deployed troops from the Libyan army to secure the area and enforce the ceasefire.

12. On 21 April, fighting broke out in the south-eastern town of Kufra. The Libya Shield brigade, an auxiliary unit of the Libyan army, had been deployed to the area in February to enforce a ceasefire between the Tabu and Zwaya brigades. Further clashes erupted on 9 June between the Libya Shield and Tabu brigades, amid accusations that the former had compromised its neutrality by aligning itself with the Arab Zwaya tribe. This led to demands by the Tabu community for the brigade's replacement by Libyan army troops. This round of clashes left some 44 people dead and 150 wounded. A delegation from the Committee of Wise Men for Negotiation arrived to broker a ceasefire, but negotiations on its modalities were disrupted when fighting resumed on 29 June. The authorities dispatched an additional brigade to restore calm, while also beginning the withdrawal of the Libya Shield brigade from the area.

13. Tensions in the west, mainly relating to long-standing land disputes and rivalry between competing groups over border control, spilled into open conflict on 1 April between the towns of Zuwarah, on one side, and Al-Jumail and Riqdalin, on the other. Clashes ensued for three days until a ceasefire was secured. Approximately 48 people were killed.

14. Following an armed clash on 14 May between Arabs and Tuaregs in Ghadamis, resulting in 10 deaths, an estimated 1,600 Tuareg residents of the city were displaced to nearby Dirj. The Tuareg member of the National Transitional Council from Ghadamis resigned in protest at the perceived Government inaction to halt the fighting and to address the grievances of the displaced Tuaregs.

15. On 10 June, fighting broke out between the Zintan and Mashashiya tribes in the Nafusa mountains, leaving more than 70 people dead and 150 injured over a six-day period. A tentative ceasefire was brokered on 16 June. Libyan army troops were interposed between the towns of Zintan and Shagiga to create a buffer zone between the two communities, which have long-standing feuds relating to land issues and political rivalries.

16. The Government also faced disturbances resulting from discontent among some brigades, in particular following the decision to suspend payments to former revolutionary fighters while procedures were put in place to regulate the disbursement of funds. This discontent most notably manifested itself on 8 May in an altercation outside the offices of the Prime Minister in which one guard and one revolutionary fighter were killed.

17. In a major security breach in Tripoli, elements from the Tarhunah-based Awfia brigade stormed the airport on 4 June in protest at the abduction of their brigade commander one day earlier. No fatalities were reported. The Libyan army has since assumed responsibility for securing the outer perimeter of the airport, with the police overseeing internal security. This incident followed the handover of the airport by the Zintan brigade to the national authorities on 20 April.

18. The reporting period also witnessed an increase in attacks in the east against Government installations, in addition to a number of attacks directed at members

and premises of the international community. The latest wave of post-electoral violence in Benghazi included a series of targeted attacks against Government installations and former security officials in July and August, some of which coincided with the anniversary of the assassination in 2011 of Abdulfattah Yunis, the former Minister of the Interior who defected and took command of the revolutionary armed forces.

19. In the east, the Council of Barqah continued to pursue its federalist agenda and threatened to disrupt polling unless its grievances regarding the perceived marginalization of the region were addressed. On 26 May, it dispatched a symbolic detachment of its National Guard to the Wadi al-Ahmar area, which was later withdrawn. Subsequently, in a 48-hour ultimatum to the National Transitional Council, it threatened to take control of oil and other strategic installations if its demands went unmet. The election-related violence in the east referred to above was attributed to protesters believed to be affiliated to the Council of Barqah.

III. Activities of the Mission

A. Electoral support

20. The High National Election Commission displayed professionalism, transparency and flexibility in preparing for and administering the polls of 7 July, a feat for any organization but particularly remarkable for a body that had been in existence for fewer than 150 days at the time of polling. The accomplishment was not realized alone. The goodwill and cooperation of a wide variety of national actors, including the Government, the National Transitional Council, the security forces, political entities, candidates, civil society and voters, also contributed to the credibility and successful outcome of the process.

21. Of an estimated 3.2 million to 3.5 million eligible voters, more than 2.8 million, 45 per cent of whom were women, registered for the elections. The compressed timelines and very limited voter information notwithstanding, the registration process nationwide was deemed largely successful.

22. The vetting process conducted by the Integrity and Patriotism Commission resulted in the removal of 150 candidates from the final lists. A total of 2,501 candidates, including 84 women, participated as individuals in the majoritarian race, while 1,207 candidates, including 545 women, contested the proportional representation race for political entities. The election campaign, which ran from 18 June to 5 July, proceeded smoothly with no major incidents.

23. The election date of 7 July represented a delay of less than three weeks beyond the time frame for the holding of elections specified in the Constitutional Declaration. The delay was required for technical preparations and campaigning once candidates had been nominated and vetted. In addition to the operational and logistical demands associated with the short planning timeline, challenges were also encountered in the establishment of a clear legal and regulatory framework for electoral authorities, political groups, civil society and the media; the clear delimitation of the 89 electoral constituencies; and the provision of adequate information to voters, candidates and other stakeholders critical to the process.

24. Some 1.77 million Libyans, 39 per cent of whom were women, cast ballots in 1,546 polling centres around the country. Out-of-country voting also took place from 3 to 7 July in six countries, with more than 8,000 Libyans participating. Special provision was made for internally displaced persons. Over half of the internally displaced persons registered to vote cast a ballot.

25. More than 21,000 domestic observers and agents were registered to observe the polls and guard against irregularities, representing a substantial achievement in a country where civil society and political organizations had, until recently, been suppressed. Some 190 international observers from 10 organizations, including the African Union, the League of Arab States, the European Union and the Carter Center, monitored the elections. Public assessments by both domestic and international observers were largely positive and provided constructive recommendations for enhancing future electoral processes.

26. On 9 July, the High National Election Commission began to release partial results as they became available. On 17 July, the Commission made public the full preliminary results of the elections, beginning a 48-hour period during which results could be challenged before the courts. At the same time, the Commission and judicial authorities adjudicated final complaints regarding the process. Following the resolution of both appeals and complaints, the Commission announced the final results on 1 August.

27. As requested by the Libyan authorities, the United Nations Electoral Support Team, comprising UNSMIL, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Office for Project Services, provided substantive advice, technical assistance and operational support to the Commission throughout the electoral process. Some 55 United Nations electoral advisers based in Tripoli, Benghazi and Sabha worked closely with the Commission and its 13 field offices. Complementary efforts were made in support of voter and civic education, partially enabled by a contribution of $1.9 million from the Peacebuilding Support Office. Those efforts helped to provide a foundation of knowledge and experience in democratic electoral processes that will continue to serve Libya throughout the transition and beyond.

B. Human rights, transitional justice and rule of law

28. Conflict-related detentions remained a major challenge in post-electoral Libya. Some 3,000 of an estimated 7,000 detainees are currently held in facilities run by the Ministry of Justice. A further 2,600 are held by military councils or supreme security committees and are therefore under some degree of State authority. This has made little difference to the plight of many who remain under the guard of revolutionary brigades and are vulnerable to mistreatment. Most have yet to be charged or released. UNSMIL continues to impress upon the Government that detaining persons outside a legal framework, in some cases for more than 10 months, is in serious breach of international human rights standards. The Mission has presented the Ministry of Justice with a strategy to fulfil its responsibility to address conflict-related detentions and has provided training to prosecutors in screening detainees. While the Ministry is implementing a more systematic approach to screening, its capacity in prison administration remains limited.

UNSMIL is coordinating a framework for international assistance to build the capacity of the judicial police, which is responsible for prison administration.

29. Cases of mistreatment or torture continued to surface during the reporting period. UNSMIL uncovered three deaths at the facilities of the Supreme Security Committee of Misratah, all of which occurred on 13 April as a direct result of torture. Assurances from Libyan officials that incidents of torture or mistreatment would be investigated and perpetrators duly punished have not been translated into effective action. UNSMIL continued to urge the Libyan authorities to address those cases, including through robust inspections of known facilities, the identification and closure of unknown facilities and investigations into cases of torture. In some instances, the Ministry of the Interior and/or local supreme security committees and military councils have conducted investigations and taken disciplinary action. The prosecutor's office in Misratah has opened a file on the deaths in custody and investigations are continuing. The head of the Supreme Security Committee of Misratah was dismissed following investigations conducted by the Ministry of the Interior into the deaths on 13 April of the three detainees referred to above.

30. Some progress was made in the reactivation of the Libyan judicial system. Almost all judges and prosecutors have reported back to duty. In most parts of the country, however, court sessions are not held regularly, except for family and civil law cases. In Benghazi and Darnah, incidents were reported in which brigades physically attacked court personnel and damaged court buildings. Prosecutors and judges continue to face threats and intimidation from brigades and, occasionally, from former regime loyalists. UNSMIL has promoted the reactivation of the court system and provided training to judges in electoral dispute resolution.

31. Steps are also being taken to strengthen the judiciary. On 26 May, the President of the Supreme Judicial Council issued a decree to establish a national committee to report on judicial reform. The 17-member committee is tasked with developing recommendations on restructuring the judiciary, its administration and legislative framework. UNSMIL has agreed to provide technical and advisory support to the committee and is also advising the Ministry of Justice in its review of the Penal Code. In addition, UNSMIL is advising the Office of the Prosecutor-General on the adoption of an overall strategy for the investigation and prosecution of past crimes.

32. On 5 June, proceedings began in the first trial of a senior official of the former regime: the former Director of the External Security Organization, Abu Zayd Dorda, who stands accused of ordering the use of live ammunition against demonstrators during the 2011 uprisings. On 24 June, Tunisia extradited the former Prime Minister, Al-Baghdadi al-Mahmudi, to Libya. Libya continued to make efforts to secure the extradition of Abdullah al-Senussi from Mauritania. The Government also continued preparations for the trial of Saif al-Islam Qadhafi, while its challenge to the admissibility of the case before the International Criminal Court remains pending.

33. To stimulate further public dialogue on transitional justice in Libya, in May 2012, UNSMIL, in partnership with the Governments of South Africa and Switzerland and the Libyan National Consultative Group, invited six international experts to the country, including former truth commissioners from Peru and South Africa, to share their experiences of fact-finding and reconciliation in their own countries. The experts met national stakeholders in Tripoli, Benghazi, Misratah,

Sabha and Zintan, where they highlighted the urgent need for genuine reconciliation based on just solutions that addressed the root causes of conflict.

34. In May, the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict issued a report highlighting the limited availability of support and services to victims of sexual violence in Libya, assessing the scope and scale of conflict-related sexual violence in Libya between February and October 2011, and underscoring other challenges, including the need for continued monitoring of sexual violence and to ensure accountability, reparations and redress for survivors.

35. On 14 June, the Supreme Court annulled Act No. 37, which had made glorifying Muammar al-Qadhafi a criminal offence and had been adopted by the National Transitional Council on 2 May. The law had been criticized by Libyan and international human rights organizations, and by UNSMIL, on the grounds that it violated freedom of speech. The Court found the law to be unconstitutional. Two laws granting amnesty remain in place, however. Act No. 38 grants amnesty for all acts performed by revolutionaries with the goal of promoting or protecting the revolution, while Act No. 35 grants amnesty for certain violations other than crimes committed by the family members and aides of Muammar al-Qadhafi. The United Nations has maintained that neither law should be interpreted or implemented in a manner that grants amnesty to those responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity, crimes of sexual violence in situations of armed conflict and/or gross violations of human rights.

36. Members of civil society have taken an increasingly active role in promoting a human rights culture, including in monitoring and speaking out against abuses of detainees and other violations. The demand for capacity-building and skills training by civil society groups with regard to basic human rights remains high. From March to July, UNSMIL conducted a countrywide programme of basic training in human rights monitoring and documentation, including in Ajdabiya, Al Khums, Azawiyah, Benghazi, Bayda, Misratah, Sabha, Tripoli, Tobruk, Zintan and Zuwarah.

C. Public security

37. Public security continues to be the dominant concern for Libyans as they await improvements in law and order and a weapons-free environment. Key factors in restoring public confidence are the rebuilding of the security institutions, including the complex issues of integrating revolutionary brigades and fighters, making progress in the development of a coherent national security architecture that ensures civilian authority and oversight, and ensuring effective coordination of the security forces. UNSMIL has been working with the relevant security ministries and Libyan security forces to assist in the development of a national security strategy.

1. Police

38. In the lead-up to the election, UNSMIL police advisers focused on election security planning and the provision of immediate technical and advisory support to the Ministry of the Interior and operational advice to police units through the Mission's offices in Tripoli and Benghazi.

39. Following the request by the Libyan authorities for UNSMIL assistance with the planning of security for the General National Congress election, the Mission assisted in establishing an election security committee headed by the Deputy Minister of the Interior to coordinate the preparation and implementation of the election security plan. UNSMIL police advisers conducted field visits with the Ministry of the Interior to Al Khums, Al Aziziyah, Awbari, Azawiyah, Gharyan and Sabha to oversee the preparation and readiness for electoral security in those districts. UNMSIL police experts assisted in the development of an election security handbook and an electoral security training curriculum. Together with police advisers from several embassies based in Tripoli, a training-of-trainers course was conducted for approximately 700 police trainers, who in turn trained some 7,000 police officers involved in election security in Libya.

40. UNSMIL police participated in a training working group within the Ministry of the Interior and in designing strategies to enhance the effectiveness of police training centres. In May, UNSMIL provided to the Ministry of the Interior curricula for new cadets and for staff officers. Efforts are continuing to restructure the Police Directorate for Training and to organize in-service training for police officers.

41. UNSMIL developed a training curriculum for the integration of revolutionaries into the operations of the Ministry, including the police, to be carried out in Libya, Jordan and Turkey. A total of 1,600 ex-combatants were trained in Jordan. Some were found unsuitable and repatriated to Libya. UNSMIL proposed an integration plan to the Ministry of the Interior to ensure transparent selection, screening and deployment processes of candidates for future training programmes. In addition, more than 800 police cadets are taking part in a training programme of approximately seven months' duration in Turkey.

42. The monthly international coordination mechanism chaired by the Ministry and UNSMIL continued to assist the Ministry in the development of its priorities and plans and to coordinate bilateral offers of assistance from the international community.

2. Libyan defence forces

43. UNSMIL has worked with the Libyan authorities and liaised with international partners in an initiative to develop Libya's first defence white paper. The white paper will serve to identify the main risks and threats facing Libya, lay out the principal military tasks, doctrine and vision, and tackle issues of civilian democratic oversight, overall command and control, and the basic structure of the armed forces, including their relationships with the Ministry of Defence and the legislature. To this end, UNSMIL facilitated two strategic planning workshops, in May and July, with Libyan and international experts, including the Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence, the Chief of Staff, the Deputy Minister of the Interior, senior defence staff and representatives of other ministries. The exercise, which is intended to be carried forward by the new Government with extensive consultation, including with civil society, has become a catalyst for Libya's defence and security sector reform efforts.

3. Border security

44. In view of prevailing Libyan and international concerns over the smuggling of arms and drugs, human trafficking and illegal migration and the spread of

transnational organized crime throughout the Sahel, the protection of Libya's southern border remains a top national security priority. A Government decision late in February to develop an integrated southern border action plan with clear command and control responsibilities has yet to be implemented. UNSMIL continued to work with Libyan stakeholders and international experts to promote the development of an operational concept for border management with a view to galvanizing bilateral and multilateral assistance and minimizing the risk of fragmentation in the security sector. The integrated border management assessment recently completed by the European Union is expected to contribute to this exercise.

4. Arms proliferation

45. While the visibility of armed brigades in the streets has diminished over the past months, the clearance of landmines and explosive remnants of war and the accounting, safe storage and control of arms and ammunition remained key concerns in many communities. Through the United Nations Mine Action Service, UNSMIL has been working closely with the Libyan armed forces and a number of brigades to develop safe arms and ammunition storage areas. UNSMIL has worked with the armed forces and the Office of the Prime Minister to develop arrangements that would coordinate all Libyan and international efforts in the areas of mine action, small arms and light weapons, ammunition storage and related chemical and nuclear materiel.

46. Of most concern is the ordnance held by the brigades and individual former fighters, and the potential danger that they pose to Libyan society. Progress has been made by UNSMIL with key revolutionary units in Misratah, following presentations in which advice was provided on the safe storage and security of ammunition and weapons. The Mission has prepared a training package on small arms and light weapons awareness and worked with the Warriors' Affairs Commission for Rehabilitation and Development to implement some weapons registration. More recently, UNSMIL has been working with the Libyan army on storage facilities and stockpile management issues.

47. During the reporting period, some progress was achieved in planning the destruction of chemical materials and weapons. Libya submitted a plan to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons for the destruction of declared chemical materials, which have now been moved and centralized at the Ruwagha depot in south-eastern Libya. It is envisaged that the destruction of some 13 tons of bulk sulphur mustard stocks could resume before the end of 2012, while the destruction of munitions filled with mustard agent is expected to begin in March 2013.

5. Landmines and explosive remnants of war

48. Between April and July, the Joint Mine Action Coordination Team cleared 176,758 items of unexploded ordnance and explosive remnants of war. To date, several hundred farms have been searched and declared safe for resumption of economic activity. In addition, some 120 schools and almost 3,000 homes have been cleared. While the results have been significant, contamination remains high in Misratah, Sirte and the Nafusa mountain regions, where 27 clearance teams and 30 mine risk education teams continue to work.

49. Risk education efforts, coordinated jointly by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Mine Action Service, continued, with more than 185,000 persons having received messages directly from risk education facilitators to date. The overall number of beneficiaries of these efforts is believed to be substantially higher, largely because of outreach through social media. In addition, UNICEF has supported training of teachers and master trainers of the Ministry of Education and has worked to integrate risk education in school curricula and textbooks. Risk education facilitator networks have expanded through the use of volunteer groups, including the Libyan Red Crescent and the Public Scout and Girl Guide Movement of Libya.

50. Humanitarian mine action continues to be limited by funding shortfalls. After some initial interest and support from donors following the launch of the mine action appeal in December 2011, support has waned. Recent proposals for support from the Government are pending a decision.

6. Integration, demobilization and reintegration

51. Together with the United Nations country team, UNSMIL continues to offer technical advice and facilitate international assistance to the Libyan authorities on integration, demobilization and reintegration issues, including to the Warriors' Affairs Commission for Rehabilitation and Development. Areas of joint action include civic education, media advice, disarmament and employment opportunities for revolutionary fighters. In June and July, in coordination with the World Health Organization and the Ministry of Health, UNSMIL deployed two experts from the Gaza Community Mental Health Programme to train approximately 175 personnel of the Warriors' Affairs Commission in psychosocial counselling and to evaluate further needs for capacity-building in referral services.

52. UNSMIL continued to coordinate and facilitate international efforts in the areas of integration, demobilization and reintegration, including through the creation of an international partners forum. On 2 May, the Warriors' Affairs Commission presented its programme to the international community, in the presence of representatives from the ministries of labour, planning and health.

D. Socioeconomic recovery and coordination of international assistance

53. On 11 March, the Government approved a budget of $52.3 billion for 2012, of which $14.6 billion was earmarked for development projects covering education, infrastructure, health and oil and gas.

54. Foreign companies and investors, seen as central to economic revival, have expressed interest in returning to Libya. Security concerns and potential challenges on the legal front have, however, discouraged many investors. In an effort to encourage their return, Libya hosted two concurrent international trade conferences, entitled "Infrastructure Libya 2012" and "Oil and Gas Libya 2012", from 23 to 26 April.

55. Following an official staff visit to Libya in May, the International Monetary Fund highlighted needs in the following areas: capacity-building of public finance mechanisms and institutions; improving the quality of education; rebuilding infrastructure; financial market development; reducing hydrocarbon dependence;

and putting in place an efficient social safety net. It also called upon Libya to set up a governance framework based on principles of transparency and accountability that would promote private-sector-led development, job creation and inclusive growth.

56. On 29 March, the Ministry of Planning hosted a meeting with the international community to present the Government's strategic plan. The meeting was co-chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister of Planning and my Deputy Special Representative. As part of the strategic plan, the Ministry presented a framework for coordination between the Government and the international community. The framework links strategic policy coordination by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister with operational coordination by the Ministry of Planning and implementation of technical cooperation activities with line ministries and other national stakeholders. It includes the creation of six sectoral working groups in the following priority areas: economic recovery; capacity-building; health and environment; education and scientific research; justice and human rights; and infrastructure and housing.

57. UNSMIL and the World Health Organization supported the ministries of planning and health in organizing two meetings of the health sector working group. The mapping of continuing and planned activities in the economic recovery and capacity-building sectors has been completed and the first working group meetings for these two areas are being planned. The meetings of the remaining sectoral working groups are expected to be held upon completion of the mapping processes. Such meetings provide opportunities for the Government and the international community jointly to identify areas in which additional international assistance is required.

58. The United Nations country team has aligned its plans with the Government's strategic plan by developing a common United Nations country team strategic framework. The revised framework was discussed at a workshop convened by the Ministry of Planning with Government line ministries and United Nations agencies on 29 July. A follow-up workshop is planned in mid-September to endorse the framework document.

E. Humanitarian situation

59. While some of the people displaced during the 2011 conflict have returned, the escalation of ethnic and tribal tensions and sporadic fighting in areas such as Ghadamis, Kufra, the Nafusa mountains and Sabha have resulted in fresh displacements of more than 25,000 persons, albeit mostly of a short-term and temporary nature. Overall, the number of internally displaced persons fluctuates between 65,000 and 80,000, primarily Tawerghas and other minorities who fear reprisals in their areas of origin.

60. Organizations including the Libyan Humanitarian Relief Agency, United Nations agencies and other national and international partners have continued to provide assistance while seeking to identify longer-term solutions, such as improved living conditions, access to schools, employment and other basic services, in addition to reconciliation between communities to allow their return to their areas of origin. Joint UNSMIL-United Nations country team missions were undertaken to Ghadamis and Dirj on 23 April, and to Zintan and Shagiga in the first week of July, to discuss community reconciliation and the peaceful resolution of disputes with local authorities and community representatives.

61. In the absence of a comprehensive legal framework governing their presence in Libya, irregular migrants and potential asylum seekers continue to be at risk of arrest, detention, deportation and exploitation with little legal recourse. While the Ministry of the Interior has gradually increased its control over some migrant detention facilities, many continue to be operated by different authorities without guidance or support. In the case of facilities in Gatroun and Umm al Aranib, more than 1,000 people, including women and children, endure overcrowding, food and water scarcity and poor sanitation. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Organization for Migration and other organizations have responded with humanitarian assistance to these and other facilities. Early in July, several hundred migrants were deported to Chad without legal review and in difficult conditions, during which time two died.

62. According to estimates by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, more than 1,300 people, including potential asylum seekers, children and pregnant women, attempted the dangerous sea crossing from Libya to Europe in 2012. Since May, more than 103 people have been declared dead or lost at sea attempting the journey.

IV. Deployment of the Mission

63. By its resolution 66/263, the General Assembly approved the Mission's human resource requirements of 272 civilian staff, comprising 177 international and 95 national staff members, and 15 Government-provided personnel to provide expertise in the area of policing and rule of law.

64. As at 10 August, a total of 168 UNSMIL international and national staff members had been deployed: 144 in Tripoli, 14 in Benghazi, 4 in Sabha and 6 at the Global Service Centre in Brindisi, Italy. The last-mentioned group continues to provide back-office support in line with the global field support strategy of the Department of Field Support.

V. Safety and security

65. The United Nations continued to operate effectively throughout Libya in the first half of 2012. Additional security concerns emerged during the second quarter, however. The international community sustained at least 10 attacks involving the use of improvised explosive devices, small arms fire and/or rocket-propelled grenades against its convoys, offices and compounds, mainly in Benghazi but also in Darnah, Misratah, Sabha and Tripoli. On 10 April, my Special Representative was the subject of one such attack on his convoy in Benghazi and, on 17 July, an UNSMIL convoy came under small arms fire outside Darnah. These attacks, which appear to have become more persistent, are thought to be the work of religious and/or political extremist elements. In recent months, United Nations vehicles have twice been hijacked in Tripoli.

66. In the light of the changing environment, the integrated United Nations security management system approach to the safety and security of United Nations personnel in Libya was further refined in April and June. Measures have been strengthened to protect United Nations personnel, in particular in the east.

VI. Future role of the Mission

67. By its resolution 2040 (2012), the Security Council requested me to report on steps taken by UNSMIL to engage with the new Government of Libya to ensure that it continued effectively to support Libya's specific needs, with a view to reviewing and adjusting the mandate as necessary. UNSMIL will continue to provide assistance that is responsive to the requests of Libyan counterparts in accordance with the principle of national ownership. In advance of the formation of the new Government and the opportunity to engage with new ministers, the following indications of the future role of UNSMIL must be regarded as provisional and subject to such engagement. These indications are based on the Mission's current mandate, which continues to be valid as it provides the Mission with the scope and breadth to prepare for a range of engagements that will probably be requested by the new Libyan authorities. UNSMIL will continue to be guided by the principle of effective coordination and will mobilize external expertise as required, based on comparative advantage.

A. Democratic transition

68. UNSMIL, together with UNDP, has offered support to the newly elected General National Congress, including induction training for members regarding their roles and responsibilities, development of internal rules and procedures and the establishment of a secretariat.

69. UNSMIL is preparing to support the Libyan constitutional development process. Given that this process must be led and owned by Libyans, all plans are contingent upon the desire of the constitutional commission for assistance. UNSMIL will offer a broad assistance package, including options for the General National Congress on the selection process, the early formation of a commission secretariat and draft rules of procedure, in addition to both induction training and continuing substantive expert assistance. UNDP is moving forward with public outreach plans, focusing on projects that provide basic civic education on constitutional issues and facilitate interaction between the Government and the public. The United Nations electoral team will support the constitutional referendum process and elections for a constituent assembly, if required.

B. Public security

70. Public security in Libya will be enhanced only if the new Government makes significant efforts to implement nationally owned security sector reforms. UNSMIL will strengthen its support in key governance areas, including the establishment of effective national security architecture and the reform and professionalization of the security forces and their respective ministries. It will continue to promote sustainable disarmament, demobilization and/or integration or reintegration programmes for ex-combatants and revolutionary brigade personnel. It will support national actors to define needs and priorities, to match them with assistance from the United Nations and other international partners and to coordinate the delivery of such assistance.

C. Arms proliferation and border security

71. UNSMIL will continue to offer its support to the Libyan authorities in ammunition and weapons management, including physical security, stockpile management and control, in addition to clearance of explosive remnants of war. In coordination with the European Union and bilateral partners, the Mission will continue to support efforts to tackle challenges relating to border security, including support to ensure an integrated and well-coordinated approach among all relevant Libyan entities. It will continue to support the implementation of the action plan adopted in March to boost regional border security.

D. Human rights, transitional justice and rule of law

72. Progress in the short term on key issues such as conflict-related detentions and the trials of former regime members is essential to building public confidence in the new Government's commitment to respecting the rule of law and human rights. UNSMIL will urge and assist the Prosecutor-General and relevant ministries to accelerate the processing of conflict-related detainees, to put in place protection measures to prevent and investigate torture and mistreatment in detention facilities and to devise a prosecutorial strategy to deal with the trials of senior former regime members. In the longer term, UNSMIL and the United Nations country team will lend strategic support in building the capacity of civil society to advocate human rights, in addition to developing policies and a framework to tackle gender-based discrimination and violence, including in relation to sexual violence. The Mission will work to support the new national authorities in articulating and implementing a coherent strategy on transitional justice that would provide a forum for the resolution of conflicts based on past grievances and enable victims to seek redress. It will continue to support the Ministry for Assistance to the Families of Martyrs and Missing Persons to strengthening its forensic capacity.

E. International coordination and partnerships

73. UNSMIL and the United Nations country team will continue to support the Government in its efforts to harmonize international support in such priority areas as democratic governance, security, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, transitional justice, economic development and basic service delivery. UNSMIL, with its international partners, will step up its efforts to support the international coordination architecture established by the Government and will continue to promote the alignment of international efforts with national priorities and sectoral plans.

F. Mission approach

74. In the context of the transition from the interim Government to its successor, the Mission's concept of operations, based on attributes of responsiveness, flexibility and speed, remains valid. The Mission's small team of senior advisers continues to provide high-level technical advice and share comparative experiences in all mandate areas, bringing in targeted expertise from outside the United Nations

system when required, in response to specific requests from the Libyan authorities. UNSMIL and the United Nations country team are developing systems to allow for the rapid identification and deployment of civilian expertise that extends beyond in-country capacity. Such a response, which in many instances is required at short notice, is being implemented under the dual imperatives of national ownership and South-South cooperation. The United Nations civilian capacity approach in Libya is designed to be driven by demand and to foster the transfer of experiences and knowledge primarily from civilian experts from the region or other countries that have undergone similar transitions.

75. To effectively implement its concept of operations, the United Nations is further consolidating internal systems and processes, including through the establishment of a dedicated civilian capacity window in the Libya Recovery Trust Fund for ease of access by United Nations agencies. As the transition moves towards new milestones, however, the ability to adequately respond to Libya's priorities will require the active engagement of the Libyan authorities to consolidate and clarify their requests for assistance and a renewed commitment by the international community to coordinate bilateral interventions, reduce transaction costs and ensure coherence.

G. Safety and security of United Nations personnel

76. The current approach to the safety and security of United Nations personnel, which was confirmed in the biannual review of the country security risk assessment for Libya, held in July, has proved to be effective and will probably remain valid for the foreseeable future. Actual and potential security risks to United Nations personnel will continue to be identified and mitigated on the basis of a systematic analysis of the operating environment, the development of key contacts with Libyan counterparts, the strategic application of United Nations resources, a measured visibility and a unique approach to United Nations facilities management, staff deployment and movement within Libya.

VII. Financial aspects

77. By its resolution 66/263, the General Assembly approved an amount of $36,039,100 for the Mission for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2012, to be charged against the provision for special political missions appropriated under section 3, political affairs, of the programme budget for the biennium 2012-2013.

78. The resource requirements on the Mission for 2013 will be submitted as part of the 2013 budgets for special political missions.

VIII. Observations and recommendations

79. The General National Congress elections on 7 July marked a major milestone in Libya's transition towards a modern democratic State and drew to a close decades of autocratic rule. I express my admiration for the determination, courage and pride with which the Libyan people went to the polls. In this regard, I wish to commend the High National Election Commission for its professionalism, transparency and

flexibility in administering the polls, given the time constraints, the volatile security environment and the dearth of experience in electoral administration. The success of these elections, including in the east of the country, where strongly entrenched feelings of marginalization proved a major challenge in the lead-up to the polls, provides a unique opportunity to channel the growing debate on representation and governance structures through political dialogue and an inclusive constitution-making process.

80. The task of carrying the political process forward rests with Libya's leaders. I encourage them to display the same spirit of determination and courage that their people have shown to ensure a smooth and successful transition beyond the revolutionary phase and begin the process of rebuilding their country. I urge them to take swift and decisive steps to form a new Government that is inclusive, broadly participatory and enjoys the support of the Libyan people. Progress in this regard will allow for immediate challenges to be tackled effectively, including the difficult process of building strong, accountable and modern State institutions, the collection of arms and the integration of revolutionaries into security institutions. This will help to put the country on the path towards democracy, national reconciliation and long-term stability.

81. Post-revolution Libya has afforded women and young people the long-awaited opportunity to be part of this political process. The electoral process helped to galvanize women as voters and candidates and to energize a growing civil society movement, which is now mobilized to contribute to Libya's continued democratic transformation and to advocate political and human rights.

82. The new Libyan authorities will face significant challenges and a heavy legacy from the former regime as they endeavour to tackle illegal migration and smuggling, border control, the proliferation of weapons, reversing policies of long-standing discrimination against minority communities and national reconciliation. The periodic fighting between various communities is a stark reminder of the urgent need for a structured and concerted effort by the State towards national reconciliation, and issues relating to transitional justice and the rule of law.

83. I remain deeply concerned about the length of detention and treatment of detainees in Libya. I urge the country's leadership to accelerate measures to deal with this issue and, in particular, to charge or release conflict-related detainees, so that no one is held outside the framework of the law. The conditions of migrants and third-country nationals in detention also need urgent improvement, and a new policy framework must be developed to regulate migrant labour in a manner that can benefit Libya and its neighbours while respecting the human rights of migrants. Cases of mistreatment and torture in detention should be investigated and perpetrators held accountable. The drafting of a new constitution represents an opportunity to ensure that the fundamental rights of individuals are both protected and enforced by strong State institutions. Strong rule of law institutions are essential to Libya's future as a democracy.

84. The time is ripe to implement an effective strategy to tackle the crimes of the past. While the recent commencement of trials of former senior regime figures is a welcome development, there should be safeguards to ensure that the trials are conducted fairly and transparently. There is also a need for a truth-seeking process that is victim-centred and socially dynamic, led by individuals who are representative of the diverse composition of Libyan society. The process should culminate in

reparations, reconciliation between communities and recommendations for reform. An effective transitional justice strategy will help to consolidate democracy and rebuild trust in State institutions charged with enforcing the rule of law.

85. The early signs of Libya's transformation to a democratic State where the rule of law prevails are positive, but security remains fragile, with several security forces exercising coercive force. Differing tribal, regional and criminal interests are likely to persist and compete for political and economic power, while the continuing threat posed by the large numbers of available weapons and ordnance could undermine the public's sense of security and its confidence in the capability of the Libyan security forces.

86. The successful demobilization and integration or reintegration of former fighters is important, but will depend on the achievement of broad public and political consensus in several priority areas, which may be difficult in the near term. There will be a need for consensus on national security architecture and on the implementation of meaningful defence and police reform programmes. Such programmes must be able to demonstrate to the Libyan population that the State's security forces are under democratic civilian control, are professional and effective and will be held accountable for their actions. This is a heavy task for a country that has little tradition in these critical matters and will need to be underwritten by new legislation. Strong political commitment by the new Government, backed by a united approach from the international community, provides the best chance of success, but both may prove difficult to achieve in a contentious environment.

87. The fragmented domestic security situation remains an obstacle to the establishment of effective border security and counter-trafficking and counter-terrorism mechanisms, in addition to controls over the acquisition of materiel by security forces and the broader population. Failure to promptly meet these concerns will make the task of security sector reform and restructuring more difficult. In dealing with this fragile security situation, I call upon the Security Council to join me in encouraging regional organizations and Member States to support the Mission's coordination role. Its advisory approach has proved successful to date and should be continued, but must be complemented by a flexible and timely ability to swiftly assemble international expertise capable of providing Libya with the right advice at the right time.

88. In a context of immense challenges and numerous priorities, the Government needs time and capacity to articulate a vision for the full range of support that it requires from the international community. It is expected that requests for support will be formulated gradually on the basis of emerging needs. For its part, the international community needs to ensure that assistance provided to Libya is harmonized and consistent, corresponding to Libyan priority needs. This requires strengthening the international community's engagement in the coordination structures jointly established by the Government and the international community and supporting Libyan efforts to coordinate international assistance so that adequate and timely support is provided to the new Government in its State-building efforts.

89. Libya now stands at another key moment in forging its future. It has shown the international community, beyond dire predictions, the capacity of its people to rise to immense challenges. The United Nations and the international community must again support Libya's new political and civil society leaders in the next phase of its transition.

90. In closing, I commend the Libyan authorities and the Libyan people for their efforts in consolidating their democratic transition, in particular the historic elections of 7 July. I wish to thank the National Transitional Council and the interim Government for their close cooperation and collaboration with the United Nations. I am grateful to the people of Libya for their support to the United Nations. I thank all those international development partners, regional organizations and others who have supported the Libyan people in their efforts to secure peace and stability. I wish to extend my sincere appreciation to the staff of UNSMIL and the United Nations system for their continued efforts to support Libya's transition under the leadership of my Special Representative, Ian Martin. Lastly, I thank Mr. Martin for his exemplary service in support of the Libyan people and in leading UNSMIL.

United Nations S/2012/677

Security Council

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Note by the President of the Security Council

At its 6335th meeting, held on 9 June 2010 in connection with the item entitled "Non-proliferation", the Security Council adopted resolution 1929 (2010).

In paragraph 4 of the resolution, the Security Council requested the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to communicate to the Council all his reports on the application of safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Accordingly, the President herewith circulates the report of the Director General dated 30 August 2012 (see annex).

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Annex

Letter dated 30 August 2012 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to enclose herewith the report requested by the Security Council in its resolution 1929 (2010), which I have submitted today to the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (see enclosure).

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and the enclosed report to the attention of all Members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yukiya **Amano**

Enclosure*

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Report by the Director General

A. Introduction

1. This report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the Security Council, is on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement[1] and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran).

2. The Security Council has affirmed that the steps required by the Board of Governors in its resolutions[2] are binding on Iran.[3] The relevant provisions of the aforementioned Security Council resolutions were adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and are mandatory, in accordance with the terms of those resolutions.[4]

3. By virtue of its Relationship Agreement with the United Nations,[5] the Agency is required to cooperate with the Security Council in the exercise of the Council's responsibility for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security. All Member States of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council,[6] and in this respect, to take actions which are consistent with their obligations under the United Nations Charter.

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* Circulated to the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency under the symbol GOV/2012/37.

[1] The Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/214), which entered into force on 15 May 1974.

[2] The Board of Governors has adopted 11 resolutions in connection with the implementation of safeguards in Iran: GOV/2003/69 (12 September 2003); GOV/2003/81 (26 November 2003); GOV/2004/21 (13 March 2004); GOV/2004/49 (18 June 2004); GOV/2004/79 (18 September 2004); GOV/2004/90 (29 November 2004); GOV/2005/64 (11 August 2005); GOV/2005/77 (24 September 2005); GOV/2006/14 (4 February 2006); GOV/2009/82 (27 November 2009); and GOV/2011/69 (18 November 2011).

[3] In resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council: affirmed, inter alia, that Iran shall, without further delay, take the steps required by the Board in GOV/2006/14 and GOV/2009/82; reaffirmed Iran's obligation to cooperate fully with the IAEA on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear programme; decided that Iran shall, without delay, comply fully and without qualification with its Safeguards Agreement, including through the application of modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements; and called upon Iran to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of its Additional Protocol and to ratify it promptly (operative paras. 1-6).

[4] The United Nations Security Council has adopted the following resolutions on Iran: 1696 (2006); 1737 (2006); 1747 (2007); 1803 (2008); 1835 (2008); and 1929 (2010).

[5] The Agreement Governing the Relationship between the United Nations and the IAEA entered into force on 14 November 1957, following approval by the General Conference, upon recommendation of the Board of Governors, and approval by the General Assembly of the United Nations. It is reproduced in INFCIRC/11 (30 October 1959), Part I.A.

[6] The Charter of the United Nations, Article 25.

4. This report addresses developments since the last report (GOV/2012/23, 25 May 2012), as well as issues of longer standing. It focuses on those areas where Iran has not fully implemented its binding obligations, as the full implementation of these obligations is needed to establish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

B. Clarification of Unresolved Issues

5. As previously reported, on 18 November 2011 the Board of Governors adopted resolution GOV/2011/69 in which, inter alia, it stressed that it was essential for Iran and the Agency to intensify their dialogue aimed at the urgent resolution of all outstanding substantive issues for the purpose of providing clarifications regarding those issues, including access to all relevant information, documentation, sites, material and personnel in Iran. In that resolution, the Board also called on Iran to engage seriously and without preconditions in talks aimed at restoring international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. In light of this, the Agency and Iranian officials held talks in Tehran and Vienna,[7] during which a structured approach to the clarification of all outstanding issues was discussed, focusing on the issues outlined in the Annex to the Director General's November 2011 report and the Agency's request for access to the Parchin site. Issues related to the correctness and completeness of Iran's declarations, other than those included in the Annex to the November 2011 report, were to be addressed separately. During the talks in Vienna on 14 and 15 May 2012, Iran stated that access to the Parchin site would not be possible before agreement had been reached on a structured approach.[8]

6. As also previously reported, on 21 May 2012 the Director General held meetings with senior Iranian officials in Tehran to discuss issues of mutual interest.[9] Although some differences between Iran and the Agency on the document resulting from the talks on 14 and 15 May 2012 remained, H.E. Mr Saeed Jalili, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, made clear during a meeting with the Director General that these were not obstacles to reaching agreement on a structured approach.

7. Further talks between the Agency and Iranian officials were held in Vienna on 8 June 2012 and 24 August 2012 with a view to finalizing the structured approach, based on the document resulting from the talks in May 2012. However, important differences remain and no agreement could be reached on the structured approach.

8. Despite the intensified dialogue between the Agency and Iran since January 2012, efforts to resolve all outstanding substantive issues have achieved no concrete results: Iran, in an initial declaration,[10] simply dismissed the Agency's concerns in connection with the issues identified in Section C of the Annex to GOV/2011/65; Iran has not responded to the Agency's initial questions on Parchin and the foreign expert; Iran has not provided the Agency with access to the location within the Parchin site to which the Agency has requested access; and Iran has been conducting

[7] GOV/2012/23, paras. 5 and 7.
[8] GOV/2012/23, para. 7.
[9] GOV/2012/23, para. 9
[10] GOV/2012/9, para. 8.

activities at that location that will significantly hamper the Agency's ability to conduct effective verification. Notwithstanding Mr Jalili's statement referred to above, agreement on the structured approach has yet to materialize.

C. Facilities Declared under Iran's Safeguards Agreement

9. Under its Safeguards Agreement, Iran has declared to the Agency 16 nuclear facilities and nine locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOFs).[11] Notwithstanding that certain of the activities being undertaken by Iran at some of the facilities are contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, as indicated below, the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared material at these facilities and LOFs.

D. Enrichment Related Activities

10. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities in the declared facilities referred to below. All of these activities are under Agency safeguards, and all of the nuclear material, installed cascades and the feed and withdrawal stations at those facilities are subject to Agency containment and surveillance.[12]

11. Iran has stated that the purpose of enriching UF_6 up to 5% U-235 is the production of fuel for its nuclear facilities[13] and that the purpose of enriching UF_6 up to 20% U-235 is the manufacture of fuel for research reactors.[14]

12. Since Iran began enriching uranium at its declared facilities, it has produced at those facilities approximately:

- 6876 kg (+679 kg since the previous report) of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 (see Figures 1 and 2)
- 189.4 kg (+43.8 kg since the previous report) of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 (see Figures 3 and 4)

D.1. Natanz: Fuel Enrichment Plant and Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant

13. **Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP):** FEP is a centrifuge enrichment plant for the production of low enriched uranium (LEU)enriched up to 5% U-235, which was

[11] All of the LOFs are situated within hospitals.

[12] In line with normal safeguards practice, small amounts of nuclear material at the facility (e.g. some waste and samples) are not subject to containment and surveillance.

[13] As declared in Iran's Design Information Questionnaires (DIQs) for the Fuel Enrichment Plant.

[14] GOV/2010/10, para. 8; H.E. Mr Fereydoun Abbasi, Vice President of Iran and Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, reportedly made a statement to the effect that Iran plans to build four to five new reactors in the next few years in order to produce radioisotopes and carry out research ('Iran will not stop producing 20% enriched uranium', Tehran Times, 12 April 2011). He was also quoted by the Iranian Student's News Agency as saying "To provide fuel for these (new) reactors, we need to continue with the 20 per cent enrichment of uranium" ('Iran to build new nuclear research reactors — report', Reuters, 11 April 2011).

first brought into operation in 2007. The plant is divided into Production Hall A and Production Hall B. According to design information submitted by Iran, eight units are planned for Production Hall A, with 18 cascades in each unit. No detailed design information has yet been provided for Production Hall B.

14. As of 21 August 2012, Iran had fully installed 55 cascades in Production Hall A, of which 54 were declared by Iran as being fed with natural UF_6,[15] and partially installed one other cascade. Preparatory installation work had been completed for another 34 cascades, and was ongoing in relation to 54 others (see Figure 5). All the centrifuges installed in Production Hall A are IR-1 machines. During a design information verification (DIV) on 11 August 2012, the Agency noted that Iran had started general preparatory work in Production Hall B. In a letter dated 23 August 2012, the Agency requested that Iran provide an updated DIQ for FEP including information for Production Hall B.

15. As previously reported,[16] the Agency has verified that, as of 16 October 2011, 55 683 kg of natural UF_6 had been fed into the cascades since production began in February 2007, and a total of 4871 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 had been produced. Iran has estimated that, between 17 October 2011 and 6 August 2012, a total of 23 698 kg of natural UF_6 was fed into the cascades and a total of approximately 2005 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 had been produced, which would result in a total production of 6876 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 since production began.

16. Based on the results of the analysis of environmental samples taken at FEP since February 2007[17] and other verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in the relevant DIQ.

17. **Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP):** PFEP is a research and development (R&D) facility, and a pilot LEU production facility, which was first brought into operation in October 2003. It has a cascade hall that can accommodate six cascades, and is divided between an area designated for the production of LEU enriched up to 20% U-235 (Cascades 1 and 6) and an area designated for R&D (Cascades 2, 3, 4 and 5) (see Figure 6).

18. ***Production area:*** As of 21 August 2012, Iran was feeding low enriched UF_6 into two interconnected cascades (Cascades 1 and 6).

19. As previously reported,[18] the Agency has verified that, as of 13 September 2011, 720.8 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 produced at FEP had been fed into the cascades in the production area since production began in February 2010, and that a total of 73.7 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 had been produced. Iran has estimated that, between 14 September 2011 and 21 August 2012, a total of 364 kg of

[15] Not all of the 9156 centrifuges in the cascades that were being fed with UF_6 may have been working.

[16] GOV/2012/9, para. 14.

[17] Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 30 March 2012. Since the plant was first brought into operation, the Agency has taken a large number of environmental samples at FEP, the results of which have indicated a level of enrichment of uranium of less than 5% U-235. A small number of particles from environmental samples taken in the cascade area continue to be found with enrichment levels above 5%, which are higher than the level stated in the DIQ for FEP. As noted in GOV/2010/46, paragraph 7, the Agency assesses that these results refer to a known technical phenomenon associated with the start-up of centrifuge cascades.

[18] GOV/2011/65, para. 15.

UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 at FEP was fed into the cascades in the production area and that approximately 50.4 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 were produced. This would result in a total production of 124.1 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 at PFEP since production began.

20. ***R&D area:*** Since the previous report, Iran has been intermittently feeding natural UF_6 into IR-2m and IR-4 centrifuges, sometimes into single machines and sometimes into small or larger cascades. Iran has yet to install three new types of centrifuge (IR-5, IR-6 and IR-6s) as it had indicated it intends to do.[19] Iran has also been intermittently feeding one cascade with depleted UF_6 instead of natural UF_6.

21. Between 19 May 2012 and 21 August 2012, a total of approximately 3.4 kg of natural UF_6 and 20.3 kg of depleted UF_6 was fed into centrifuges in the R&D area, but no LEU was withdrawn as the product and the tails were recombined at the end of the process.

22. Based on the results of the analysis of the environmental samples taken at PFEP[20] and other verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in the relevant DIQ.

D.2. Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant

23. The Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) is, according to the DIQ of 18 January 2012,[21] a centrifuge enrichment plant for the production of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 and the production of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235. Additional information from Iran is still needed in connection with this facility, particularly in light of the difference between the original stated purpose of the facility and the purpose for which it is now being used.[22] The facility, which was first brought into operation in 2011, is being built to contain 16 cascades, equally divided between Unit 1 and Unit 2, with a total of approximately 3000 centrifuges.[23] To date, all of the centrifuges installed are IR-1 machines.

24. As of 18 August 2012, Iran had installed all eight cascades in Unit 2, four of which (configured in two sets of two interconnected cascades) it was feeding with UF_6 enriched to 3.5% U-235. In Unit 1, Iran had completely installed four cascades and partially installed a fifth cascade, none of which it was feeding with UF_6 (see Figure 7).

25. Iran has estimated that, between 14 December 2011, when feeding of the first set of two interconnected cascades began, and 12 August 2012, a total of 482 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 was fed into cascades at FFEP, and that approximately 65.3 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 were produced, 50 kg of which has been withdrawn from the process and verified by the Agency.

[19] GOV/2012/23, para. 20.

[20] Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 21 April 2012.

[21] To date, Iran has provided the Agency with an initial DIQ and three revised DIQs (GOV/2012/9, para. 24).

[22] GOV/2009/74, para. 14.

[23] GOV/2009/74, para. 9.

26. With regard to the presence of particles with enrichment levels above 20% U-235,[24] Iran's explanation is not inconsistent with the further assessment made by the Agency since the previous report.[25] The Agency and Iran have exchanged views on ways to avoid a recurrence of transient enrichment levels above the level stated in the DIQ.

D.3. Other Enrichment Related Activities

27. The Agency is still awaiting a substantive response from Iran to Agency requests for further information in relation to announcements made by Iran concerning the construction of ten new uranium enrichment facilities, the sites for five of which, according to Iran, have been decided.[26] Iran has not provided information, as requested by the Agency, in connection with its announcement on 7 February 2010 that it possessed laser enrichment technology.[27] As a result of Iran's lack of cooperation on those issues, the Agency is unable to verify and report fully on these matters.

E. Reprocessing Activities

28. Pursuant to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran is obliged to suspend its reprocessing activities, including R&D.[28] In a letter to the Agency dated 15 February 2008, Iran stated that it "does not have reprocessing activities". In that context, the Agency has continued to monitor the use of hot cells at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)[29] and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility.[30] The Agency carried out an inspection and DIV at TRR on 6 August 2012, and a DIV at the MIX Facility on 8 August 2012. It is only with respect to TRR, the MIX Facility and the other facilities to which the Agency has access that the Agency can confirm that there are no ongoing reprocessing related activities in Iran.

F. Heavy Water Related Projects

29. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has not suspended work on all heavy water related projects, including the construction of the heavy water moderated research reactor at Arak,

[24] GOV/2012/23, para. 28.

[25] On 11 April 2012, Iran disconnected the product cylinder from the process and the Agency verified that the enrichment level of the UF_6 contained in the product cylinder was 19.2%, i.e. within the level stated in the DIQ.

[26] "Iran Specifies Location for 10 New Enrichment Sites", Fars News Agency, 16 August 2010.

[27] Cited on the website of the Presidency of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 7 February 2010, at http://www.president.ir/en/?ArtID=20255.

[28] S/RES/1696 (2006), para. 2; S/RES/1737 (2006), para. 2; S/RES/1747 (2007), para. 1; S/RES/1803 (2008), para. 1; S/RES/1835 (2008), para. 4; S/RES/1929 (2010), para. 2.

[29] TRR is a 5 MW reactor which operates with 20% U-235 enriched fuel and is used for the irradiation of different types of targets and for research and training purposes.

[30] The MIX Facility is a hot cell complex for the separation of radiopharmaceutical isotopes from targets, including uranium, irradiated at TRR. The MIX Facility is not currently processing any uranium targets.

the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40 Reactor), which is under Agency safeguards.[31]

30. On 1 August 2012, the Agency carried out a DIV at the IR-40 Reactor at Arak and observed that, as part of the facility's ongoing construction, cooling and moderator circuit piping was being installed. As previously reported, Iran has stated that the operation of the IR-40 Reactor is due to commence in the third quarter of 2013.[32]

31. Since its visit to the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) on 17 August 2011, the Agency has not been provided with further access to the plant. As a result, the Agency is again relying on satellite imagery to monitor the status of HWPP. Based on recent images, the plant appears to be in operation. To date, Iran has not permitted the Agency to take samples from the heavy water stored at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF).[33]

G. Uranium Conversion and Fuel Fabrication

32. Although it is obliged to suspend all enrichment related activities and heavy water related projects, Iran is conducting a number of activities at UCF, the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) and the Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP) at Esfahan, as indicated below, which are in contravention of those obligations, although the facilities are under Agency safeguards. Iran has stated that it is conducting these activities in order to make fuel for research reactors.[34]

33. According to the latest information available to the Agency, Iran has produced:

- at UCF: 550 tonnes of natural UF_6, 91 tonnes of which has been sent to FEP; and
- at FMP and FPFP: seven fuel items containing uranium enriched up to 20% U-235, two fuel items containing uranium enriched to 3.34% U-235 and five fuel items containing natural uranium (see Figure 8).

34. **Uranium Conversion Facility:** Between 5 and 9 March 2012, the Agency carried out a physical inventory verification (PIV) at UCF, the results of which are now being evaluated by the Agency. As previously reported, the Agency has verified that Iran produced 24 kg of uranium in the form of UO_2 during R&D activities involving the conversion of UF_6 enriched up to 3.34% U-235 into UO_2, and that 13.6 kg of uranium in the form of UO_2 was subsequently transferred to FMP.[35] As of 10 August 2012, Iran had resumed these R&D activities, but had not produced additional uranium in the form of UO_2. As of the same date, Iran, through the conversion of uranium ore concentrate (UOC), had produced about 3340 kg of natural uranium in the form of UO_2, of which the Agency has verified that Iran transferred 1272 kg to FMP (see Figure 9).

[31] S/RES/1737 (2006), para. 2; S/RES/1747 (2007), para. 1; S/RES/1803 (2008), para. 1; S/RES/1835 (2008), para. 4; S/RES/1929 (2010), para. 2.
[32] GOV/2012/23, para. 32.
[33] GOV/2010/10, paras. 20 and 21.
[34] As declared in Iran's DIQs for FPFP.
[35] GOV/2012/23, para. 35.

35. On 22 April 2012, Iran introduced into the UCF process area 25 drums containing approximately 6560 kg of domestically produced UOC, and 25 drums containing approximately 9180 kg of UOC taken from Iran's stockpile of imported UOC.[36] Iran has mixed together the UOC from these 50 drums and used it for the production of natural UO_2.

36. **Fuel Manufacturing Plant:** On 22 August 2012, the Agency carried out a DIV and an inspection at FMP and confirmed that the manufacture of pellets for the IR-40 Reactor using natural UO_2 was ongoing. While Iran was continuing to manufacture dummy fuel assemblies for the IR-40 Reactor,[37] it was not manufacturing fuel assemblies containing nuclear material.

37. **Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant:** As previously reported,[38] Iran has combined into one facility the activities involving the conversion of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 into U_3O_8 and the manufacture of fuel assemblies made of fuel plates containing U_3O_8. Between the start of conversion activities on 17 December 2011 and 12 August 2012, Iran has fed into the process 71.25 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 and produced 31.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 20% U-235 in the form of U_3O_8.

H. Possible Military Dimensions

38. Previous reports by the Director General have identified outstanding issues related to possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme and actions required of Iran to resolve these.[39] Since 2002, the Agency has become increasingly concerned about the possible existence in Iran of undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile.

39. The Annex to the Director General's November 2011 report (GOV/2011/65) provided a detailed analysis of the information available to the Agency, indicating that Iran has carried out activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. This information, which comes from a wide variety of independent sources, including from a number of Member States, from the Agency's own efforts and from information provided by Iran itself, is assessed by the Agency to be, overall, credible. The information indicates that, prior to the end of 2003 the activities took place under a structured programme; that some continued after 2003; and that some may still be ongoing. Since November 2011, the Agency has obtained more information which further corroborates the analysis contained in the aforementioned Annex.

40. In resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council reaffirmed Iran's obligations to take the steps required by the Board of Governors in its resolutions GOV/2006/14 and GOV/2009/82, and to cooperate fully with the Agency on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions

[36] GOV/2003/75, Annex I, para. 8.
[37] A dummy assembly is similar to a fuel assembly except that it contains non-nuclear material.
[38] GOV/2012/23, para. 38.
[39] GOV/2011/29, para. 35; GOV/2011/7, Attachment; GOV/2010/10, paras. 40-45; GOV/2009/55, paras. 18-25; GOV/2008/38, paras. 14-21; GOV/2008/15, paras. 14-25 and Annex; GOV/2008/4, paras. 35-42; GOV/2011/65, paras. 38-45 and Annex.

to Iran's nuclear programme, including by providing access without delay to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the Agency.[40] In its resolution GOV/2011/69 of 18 November 2011, the Board of Governors, inter alia, expressed its deep and increasing concern about the unresolved issues regarding the Iranian nuclear programme, including those which need to be clarified to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions.

41. **Parchin:** As stated in the Annex to the Director General's November 2011 report,[41] information provided to the Agency by Member States indicates that Iran constructed a large explosives containment vessel in which to conduct hydrodynamic experiments. The information also indicates that this vessel was installed at the Parchin site in 2000. The location at the Parchin site of the vessel was only identified in March 2011. The Agency notified Iran of that location in January 2012.

42. Satellite imagery available to the Agency for the period from February 2005 to January 2012 shows virtually no activity at or near the building housing the containment vessel. However, since the Agency's first request for access to this location, satellite imagery shows that extensive activities and resultant changes have taken place at this location. A number of satellite images of the location since February 2012 show: large amounts of liquid 'run off' emanating from the building in which the vessel is housed; equipment in open storage immediately outside the building; the removal of external fixtures from the building itself; and the presence of light and heavy vehicles. Satellite imagery shows that, as of May 2012, five other buildings or structures at the location had been demolished, and power lines, fences and all paved roads had been removed. Significant ground scraping and landscaping have been undertaken over an extensive area at and around the location, with new dirt roads established. Satellite images from August 2012 show the containment vessel building shrouded. In light of these extensive activities, the Agency's ability to verify the information on which its concerns are based has been adversely affected and, when the Agency gains access to the location, its ability to conduct effective verification will have been significantly hampered.

43. In a letter to the Agency dated 29 August 2012, Iran stated that the allegation of nuclear activities at the Parchin site is "baseless" and that "the recent activities claimed to be conducted in the vicinity of the location of interest to the Agency, has nothing to do with specified location by the Agency".

44. The activities observed and Iran's letter of 29 August 2012 further strengthen the Agency's assessment that it is necessary to have access to the location at Parchin without further delay.

I. Design Information

45. Contrary to its Safeguards Agreement and relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran is not implementing the provisions of the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to Iran's Safeguards

[40] S/RES/1929, paras. 2 and 3.
[41] GOV/2011/65, Annex, para. 49.

Agreement,[42] which provides for the submission to the Agency of design information for new facilities as soon as the decision to construct, or to authorize construction of, a new facility has been taken, whichever is the earlier. The modified Code 3.1 also provides for the submission of fuller design information as the design is developed early in the project definition, preliminary design, construction and commissioning phases. Iran remains the only State with significant nuclear activities in which the Agency is implementing a comprehensive safeguards agreement that is not implementing the provisions of the modified Code 3.1. It is important to note that the absence of such early information reduces the time available for the Agency to plan the necessary safeguards arrangements, especially for new facilities, and reduces the level of confidence in the absence of other nuclear facilities.[43]

46. Iran last provided the Agency with some updated information on the IR-40 Reactor in 2007, but has not provided a DIQ for the facility since 2006. Since 2007, Iran has conducted significant additional design and construction work on the reactor, but has not provided further information, as required pursuant to modified Code 3.1 of Iran's Subsidiary Arrangements General Part. The lack of up-to-date information on the IR-40 Reactor is now having an adverse impact on the Agency's ability to effectively verify the design of the facility and to implement an effective safeguards approach. On 1 August 2012, the Agency conducted a survey of the site in order to identify which safeguards equipment it would need to install at the IR-40 Reactor and where it should be located. Although Iran provided the Agency with some relevant technical details during that visit, it did not provide an updated DIQ.

47. As previously reported, Iran's response to Agency requests that Iran confirm or provide further information regarding its stated intention to construct new nuclear facilities is that it would provide the Agency with the required information in "due time" rather than as required by the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to its Safeguards Agreement.[44]

J. Additional Protocol

48. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran is not implementing its Additional Protocol. The Agency will not be in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran unless and until Iran provides the necessary cooperation with the Agency, including by implementing its Additional Protocol.[45]

[42] In accordance with Article 39 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement, agreed Subsidiary Arrangements cannot be changed unilaterally; nor is there a mechanism in the Safeguards Agreement for the suspension of provisions agreed to in the Subsidiary Arrangements. Therefore, as previously explained in the Director General's reports (see, for example, GOV/2007/22, 23 May 2007), the modified Code 3.1, as agreed to by Iran in 2003, remains in force. Iran is further bound by operative paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1929 (2010) to "comply fully and without qualification with its IAEA Safeguards Agreement, including through the application of modified Code 3.1".

[43] GOV/2010/10, para. 35.

[44] GOV/2011/29, para. 37; GOV/2012/23, para. 29.

[45] Iran's Additional Protocol was approved by the Board on 21 November 2003 and signed by Iran on 18 December 2003, although it has not been brought into force. Iran provisionally implemented its Additional Protocol between December 2003 and February 2006.

K. Other Matters

49. As previously reported,[46] the Agency found a discrepancy of 19.8 kg between the amount of nuclear material declared by the operator and that measured by the Agency in connection with conversion experiments carried out by Iran at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Research Laboratory (JHL) between 1995 and 2002.[47] Following further analysis and measurement of the relevant material by the Agency and evaluation of clarifications and corrections provided by Iran, the Agency has been able to reduce its initial estimate of the discrepancy. The Agency and Iran have agreed to conduct further analysis with a view to resolving the discrepancy.

50. In June 2012, Iran started using one of the fuel assemblies consisting of 19 fuel plates containing U_3O_8 enriched up to 20% U-235 as an integral part of the core of TRR. In August 2012, Iran also started using in the core of TRR one of the control fuel assemblies consisting of 14 fuel plates containing U_3O_8 enriched up to 20% U-235. Iran has also continued to use a fuel assembly containing 12 rods of UO_2 enriched to 3.34% U-235 as one of the control assemblies in the core of TRR. On 9 July 2012, the Agency verified the receipt at TRR of one control fuel assembly containing 14 plates and two fuel rods containing natural UO_2. As requested, Iran has provided the Agency with further information about the irradiation of nuclear material received from FMP, as well as the TRR operator's plans for irradiating such material.

51. As previously reported,[48] according to Iran, commissioning activity at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP)commenced on 31 January 2012. On 29 and 30 July 2012, the Agency conducted an inspection at BNPP while the reactor was operating at 75% of its nominal power.

L. Summary

52. While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and LOFs declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement, as Iran is not providing the necessary cooperation, including by not implementing its Additional Protocol, the Agency is unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.[49]

53. Despite the intensified dialogue between the Agency and Iran since January 2012, no concrete results have been achieved in resolving the outstanding issues. Given the nature and extent of credible information available, the Agency considers it essential for Iran to engage with the Agency without further delay on the

[46] GOV/2012/9, para. 46.

[47] This material had been under Agency seal since 2003; GOV/2003/75, paras. 20-25 and Annex 1; GOV/2004/34, para. 32, and Annex, paras. 10-12; GOV/2004/60, para. 33, Annex, paras 1-7; GOV/2011/65, para. 49.

[48] GOV/2012/9, para. 49.

[49] The Board has confirmed on numerous occasions, since as early as 1992, that paragraph 2 of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.), which corresponds to Article 2 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement, authorizes and requires the Agency to seek to verify both the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities (i.e. correctness) and the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in the State (i.e. completeness) (see, for example, GOV/OR.864, para. 49).

substance of the Agency's concerns. In the absence of such engagement, the Agency will not be able to resolve concerns about issues regarding the Iranian nuclear programme, including those which need to be clarified to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme.

54. It is a matter of concern that the activities which have taken place since February 2012 at the location within the Parchin site to which the Agency has requested access will have an adverse impact on the Agency's ability to undertake effective verification. The Agency reiterates its request for access to that location without further delay.

55. The Director General continues to urge Iran, as required in the binding resolutions of the Board of Governors and mandatory Security Council resolutions, to take steps towards the full implementation of its Safeguards Agreement and its other obligations, and to urge Iran to engage with the Agency to achieve concrete results on all outstanding substantive issues.

56. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.

Fig. 1: FEP Cumulative Production of UF_6 enriched up to 5%



Fig. 2: Summary of UF_6 Flows

	Date	Quantity	Enrichment
Produced at UCF	22 August 2012	550 000 kg	Natural
Fed into FEP	6 August 2012	79 381 kg	Natural
Produced at FEP	6 August 2012	6 876 kg	Up to 5%
Fed into PFEP	21 August 2012	1 084.8 kg	Up to 5%
Produced at PFEP	21 August 2012	124.1 kg	Up to 20%
Fed into FFEP	12 August 2012	482 kg	Up to 5%
Produced in FFEP	12 August 2012	65.3 kg	Up to 20%

Fig. 3: FFEP and PFEP - Cumulative Production of UF_6 enriched up to 20%



Fig. 4: Inventory of UF_6 enriched to 20% U-235 (August 2012)	
Produced at FFEP and PFEP	189.4 kg
Fed into conversion	96.3 kg
Down blended	1.6 kg
Stored as UF_6	91.4 kg

Fig. 5: FEP Production Hall A – Status on 21 August 2012	
Unit A21	No centrifuges installed
Unit A22	No centrifuges installed
Unit A23	No centrifuges installed
Unit A24	18 cascades of 164 IR-1 centrifuges producing UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235
Unit A25	18 cascades with empty IR-1 centrifuge casings
Unit A26	6 cascades of 164 IR-1 centrifuges producing UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 12 cascades of 174 IR-1 centrifuges producing UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-23[illegible]
Unit A27	15 cascades with empty IR-1 centrifuge casings 1 cascade of 174 IR-1 centrifuges installed 1 cascade with 93 IR-1 centrifuges installed 1 cascade empty
Unit A28	18 cascades of 174 IR-1 centrifuges producing UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235

Fig. 6: PFEP –Status on 18 August 2012	
Cascade 1	164 IR-1 centrifuges connected to Cascade 6 producing UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235
Cascade 2	10-machine cascade of IR-4 centrifuges
Cascade 3	Empty
Cascade 4	123 IR-4 centrifuges installed
Cascade 5	162 IR-2m centrifuges installed
Cascade 6	164 IR-1 centrifuges connected to Cascade 1 producing UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235

Fig. 7: FFEP –Status on 18 August 2012	
Unit 1	4 cascades each with 174 IR-1 centrifuges installed 1 cascade with 52 IR-1 centrifuges installed 3 cascades empty
Unit 2	4 cascades of 174 IR-1 centrifuges producing UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 4 cascades of 174 IR-1 centrifuges installed

Fig. 8: FMP and FPFP - Fuel items produced				
Item	**Produced**	**Unit Mass [g U]**	**Enrichment [%]**	**Irradiated or in core at TRR**
MTR Control Fuel Element	2	1 000	19	2
MTR Plate	3	75	19	1
MTR Standard Fuel Element	2	1 300	19	1
Rod Assembly	2	6 000	3.4	1
Test Rod IR-40 Reactor	3	500	NU	1
MTR Test Plate	2	5	NU	1

Fig. 9: UCF - Conversion Activities	
Activity	**Production (difference since last report)**
UF_6 (<20% U-235) into U_3O_8	31.1 kg produced (+17.1 kg)
UF_6 (<3.4 % U-235) into UO_2	24 kg produced, 13.6 kg to FMP (no change)
Natural UOC into UO_2	3340 kg produced(+1840 kg), 1272 kg to FMP (+513 kg)

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Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

I. Introduction

1. By its resolution 2012 (2011), the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) until 15 October 2012, and requested me to report on its implementation semi-annually and not later than 45 days prior to its expiration. The present report covers major developments from the issuance of my report of 29 February 2012 (S/2012/128) until 31 August 2012, and outlines activities undertaken by the Mission in line with its mandate under Security Council resolutions 1542 (2004), 1608 (2005), 1702 (2006), 1743 (2007), 1780 (2007), 1840 (2008), 1892 (2009), 1908 (2010), 1927 (2010), 1944 (2010) and 2012 (2011).

II. Political and security update

Political situation

2. During the reporting period, a number of long-awaited political milestones were reached, indicating that the process of stabilization continues to progress in Haiti. The achievements included the ratification by the Senate of a new Prime Minister and the publication of the corrected version of the constitutional amendments that had been pending since June 2011. The establishment of the Superior Council of the Judiciary (provided for in a 2007 law to strengthen the independence of the judiciary, but only now constituted) represents a further stride by the Government in strengthening rule of law institutions. The process to establish the country's first Permanent Electoral Council has, however, been mired in controversy, with some political parties represented in Parliament and civil society leaders questioning the integrity of the Council and its ability to organize credible elections.

3. On 17 April, a group of members of the former armed forces and young recruits, some of whom were carrying small arms, assembled in front of Parliament to request an audience with legislators regarding the purported plan of the Haitian National Police to forcefully dislodge them from sites that they had illegally occupied throughout the country. On 18 April, the President of Haiti, Michel Joseph Martelly, condemned the incident, calling for public order. In response to their demand for the reinstatement of the army and the disbursement of severance

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payments, he emphasized that, while the establishment of a second security force continued to be one of his priorities, it could be done only with full respect for the law. The following day, at a meeting of the Superior Council of the Haitian National Police chaired by the caretaker Prime Minister, Garry Conille, it was agreed that the situation would be resolved through negotiation. The possible use of more robust measures was also explored. As an auxiliary measure, on 6 May, MINUSTAH launched Operation Sunrise, intended to curtail the movement of people carrying illegal weapons. On 18 May, two days after the installation of the new Government, the police, supported by MINUSTAH, proceeded to vacate the 10 main occupied sites throughout the country. The operation was conducted without incidents or casualties. In June, the authorities brought to an end the group's illegal activities.

4. In May, Parliament ratified the President's choice of Laurent Lamothe as Prime Minister. On 8 May, the final day in office of 10 outgoing senators, the Senate endorsed Mr. Lamothe's general policy statement, which was based on the President's "5 E" programme (employment, rule of law, environment, energy and education). On 14 May, the Chamber of Deputies voted in favour of Mr. Lamothe by a substantial majority. Two days later, Mr. Lamothe and his Cabinet of 22 ministers (including seven women), were sworn in. On 6 August, the Prime Minister announced a partial reshuffling of the Cabinet, including the replacement of Thierry Mayard-Paul as Minister of the Interior. Mr. Mayard-Paul was subsequently appointed as an adviser by the President.

5. Parliament adjourned its first legislative session of 2012 on 14 May. The legislation adopted and sent for promulgation to the executive included the budget for the period 2011-2012, a bill governing the Office of the Ombudsman and a bill regulating banks and other financial institutions. On 29 June, during the second session of Parliament, the Government submitted for approval the draft budget for the period 2012-2013, which was adopted by the Chamber of Deputies on 10 August. A number of parliamentarians called for a precise accounting of funds spent on social programmes by the Government.

6. On 19 June, in a ceremony attended by the presidents of both chambers of Parliament and of the Supreme Court, the President of Haiti announced the publication of a corrected version of the constitutional amendments, as adopted by Parliament on 9 May 2011. Although the process of publication was marred by procedural irregularities, many welcomed the amendments, which include the establishment of a permanent electoral council, a constitutional council (responsible for exercising judicial review of constitutional matters) and a quota of 30 per cent women's representation in the Government, in addition to allowing for the possibility of holding multiple citizenship. Opponents of the publication contested the President's authority to publish the corrected amendments.

7. This development was followed on 3 July by the formal establishment by the President of the Superior Council of the Judiciary, one of the three entities, along with Parliament and the executive, responsible for selecting members of the Permanent Electoral Council under the amended Constitution. Early in July, the President and the Prime Minister officially stated their intention to hold partial legislative, municipal and local elections by the end of 2012. In the ensuing weeks, the three branches of the Government initiated negotiations to each designate three of the nine members of the Permanent Electoral Council. Following a vote by the Superior Council of the Judiciary on the designation of three people to serve on the

Permanent Electoral Council, two members of the Superior Council resigned from their posts, questioning the validity of the vote and alleging undue influence on the vote by the executive.

8. Following the establishment on 15 August, by presidential decree, of a six-member Permanent Electoral Council, including three members nominated by the executive and the Superior Council of the Judiciary, the President's spokesperson called upon Parliament to follow suit in nominating its three representatives. The Senate, following the end of the term of office of 10 senators on 8 May, has to date failed to reach a quorum in order to designate its three representatives, however. A number of legislators, citing their lack of trust in the selection process, have advocated the creation of a provisional electoral council.

9. On 16 August, a political party, Parti Haitien Tèt Kale, was officially registered at the Ministry of Justice and Public Security. It is led by the Chief of Staff of the President, Anne-Valérie Timothée Milfort.

Security assessment

10. The overall security situation throughout the reporting period remained relatively stable, with sporadic instances of civil unrest linked primarily to socioeconomic grievances and the instability caused by elements of the former armed forces and new recruits.

11. Crime statistics collected by the national police and MINUSTAH showed a significant increase in homicides during the reporting period. There was a monthly average of 99 homicides from March to July 2012, up from 75 per month during the same period in 2011. July 2012 was the most violent month since the earthquake of January 2010, with 134 homicides. From March to July 2012, there was a downward trend in the number of kidnappings, with a monthly average of 10 kidnappings, compared to an average of 14 during the same period in 2011. Violence continues to be concentrated in major urban centres. The metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince and the surrounding densely populated communes remain the zones most highly affected by criminal activity. During the reporting period, 65 per cent of all homicides in Haiti occurred in Port-au-Prince, some 85 to 90 per cent of which took place in the sensitive areas of the communes of Port-au-Prince (the areas of Bel Air, Fort National and Martissant), Cité Soleil, Carrefour and Croix des Bouquets. In those areas, armed gangs remain the main source of insecurity, committing murders, kidnappings and robberies. Gangs are also involved in narcotics and small arms trafficking, racketeering and the fight for territorial influence.

12. Although the performance of the national police has continued to improve, the institution is not yet in a position to assume full responsibility for the provision of internal security throughout the country. In this context, MINUSTAH military and police personnel continued to play a vital role in maintaining overall security and stability. The Mission, in concert with the national police, focused its efforts on the protection of vulnerable groups, in particular women and children, and maintained its military and police presence in violence-prone areas and camps for internally displaced persons.

III. Humanitarian and recovery update

13. Haiti continued to face significant humanitarian challenges during the reporting period, with many earthquake-affected camp residents remaining dependent on assistance for their basic survival. In June 2012, more than 390,000 internally displaced persons were living at 575 sites. This figure represents a reduction of 73 per cent compared to the data for July 2010, when 1,555 camps were home to 1.5 million displaced persons. At the current rate, more than 230,000 internally displaced persons are projected to still be living in camps by the end of 2012. While important progress has been made, significant humanitarian needs remain. Living conditions in the camps have deteriorated as humanitarian actors progressively withdraw for lack of funding, among other reasons. Haitians living in camps in which sanitation standards are inadequate are extremely vulnerable to natural hazards and to acute diarrhoeal infections and cholera. Since July 2010, more than 65,000 people have been evicted from 155 camps. An additional 80,000 camp residents currently face the threat of eviction from 153 camps. During the reporting period, in excess of 1.1 million children in more than 3,200 schools nationwide remained dependent on food assistance provided by the World Food Programme, in collaboration with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Bank.

14. Recovery and reconstruction efforts progressed, albeit slowly. Of the 10 million cubic metres of debris produced by the earthquake of January 2010, 70 per cent had been removed by June 2012. The United Nations country team alone managed the removal of more than 820,000 cubic metres and will reach 1 million cubic metres by the end of 2012. According to figures from March 2012, national Governments and multilateral institutions have disbursed 46.7 per cent ($2.57 billion) of the $5.50 billion in recovery programme funds that they pledged at the International Donors' Conference entitled "Towards a New Future for Haiti", held in New York on 31 March 2010. The creation of the Housing and Public Buildings Construction Unit attached to the Office of the Prime Minister contributed to improved coordination and implementation of return and relocation programmes. To date, more than 500,000 persons have benefited from the construction of 110,000 transitional shelters, the granting of 15,000 rental housing subsidies and the provision of other assistance. Since September 2011, the Government-led "16/6" relocation programme, which, together with United Nations agencies, originally aimed to support the residents of six camps and rehabilitate the 16 neighbourhoods from which most of them were displaced, has cleared at least 22 camp sites, both large and small, and relocated 5,000 families. Most of the camps, more than 70 per cent of which are located on private land, are not covered by this programme, and there remains no plan to provide durable housing solutions for their residents. The United Nations country team and partners have been supporting the development by the Government of a policy on housing and urban development, in addition to advocating the provision of redress for those living in camps and informal settlements. Such a policy would be a major step forward in the progressive realization of the right to adequate housing, in particular for poorer communities, and will hopefully include protective measures against forced evictions for inhabitants of the camps on both public and private land.

IV. Activities of the Mission

Support for the political process

15. My Special Representative has engaged intensively with political decision makers in Haiti to advocate progress on critical political processes such as the publication of the corrected constitutional amendments, the installation of the Superior Council of the Judiciary, the establishment of a dedicated task force for the preparation of the forthcoming elections and the elaboration of a legislative agenda for the continuing parliamentary session. My Special Representative has made proposals to the President, the Prime Minister and the presidents of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies on how MINUSTAH can, in line with its mandate, support their policy goals to strengthen institutions, improve the rule of law and promote sustainable development in Haiti. MINUSTAH has closely cooperated with the country's international partners, including the diplomatic corps in Port-au-Prince, to create momentum around the Government's key priorities.

Support for the forthcoming elections

16. Owing to delays in the designation of the members of the Permanent Electoral Council, the partial legislative, municipal and local elections — postponed since November 2011 — could not be held before 8 May 2012, when one third of the senators reached the end of their term of office. The terms of mayors, town delegates, communal section councils and assemblies expired in 2011. In the absence of the designated members of the Permanent Electoral Council, institutional support from MINUSTAH, assisted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), was inevitably limited, focusing mainly on strengthening the capacity of key technical staff, delimiting electoral constituencies and reviewing electoral logistics plans and an electoral bill. The new Director General of the Permanent Electoral Council took office on 7 August. The forthcoming elections will be the most complex to be held in Haiti since 2006, with an expected 35,000 candidates. In the past, local elections have been the most acrimoniously contested, often accompanied by violence. On 3 August, my Special Representative wrote to the President to outline the steps required to hold elections at the end of 2012.

Military

17. The military component of MINUSTAH continued to fulfil its primary mission of maintaining a secure and stable environment, in addition to enabling the delivery of humanitarian assistance, ensuring disaster response preparedness, planning logistics for the upcoming elections and supporting recovery efforts. In addition to the above-mentioned Operation Sunrise, the military component took part in several security operations in conjunction with the national police, including operations Meritas, Boucler Port-au-Prince I and Boucler Port-au-Prince II, targeting gang activities in the Port-au-Prince area. The military component also conducted two operations on the island of Gonâve, reinforcing the presence of the national police assigned there.

18. In addition to providing extensive engineering support to the Mission, the MINUSTAH military engineering companies supported a wide range of Government recovery priorities linked to disaster risk mitigation and the improvement of living and security conditions, such as improvements to national police facilities,

construction of new police stations, debris removal, well-drilling, road repair, land preparation for the construction of schools and hospitals, and installation of prefabricated units for the judiciary and other State institutions. The engineering units continued to prepare for the hurricane season by draining rivers and canals, including in camps for internally displaced persons.

Police

19. The development of the national police has been challenged by political deadlocks, including delays in key appointments such as the Prime Minister and the Inspector General in Chief of the national police, both of whom are also members of the Superior Council of the Haitian National Police. The delays paralysed progress in the first half of the reporting period, including the overall endorsement of the national police development plan. In a positive development, on 15 August, the Government nominated Godson Orelus, the former Director of the judicial police, as Director General ad interim of the national police. Pending ratification by the Senate, he will replace Mario Andrésol, whose term expired on 18 August.

20. The five-year development plan (2012-2016), drafted jointly by the national police and the Mission's police component, was officially submitted by the Director General to the Superior Council on 1 March. To ensure execution of the plan pending its final endorsement, the Government held a high-level summit on 29 June, attended by the President, members of the Superior Council, members of the Senate, civil society representatives, key bilateral partners and MINUSTAH. At the summit, MINUSTAH and the national police presented a joint proposal for a one-year interim strategic plan linking specific short-term objectives and commitments by major donors with the goals of the long-term development plan. The urgent priorities include budgetary support from the Government and donors with a particular focus on recruitment campaigns to augment the size of police promotions.

21. One of the plan's main objectives is to achieve a minimum of 15,000 serving police officers by 2016. This would require entry-level training at the Police School for up to 1,200 cadets in each promotion cycle, considerably more than has been the case in recent promotions. It would also require sustained efforts to reinforce the capacity of middle-level and senior officer ranks to ensure adequate on-the-job training and supervision of new recruits. Furthermore, the rapid growth of the ranks of the national police would necessitate further improvements in its logistic and administrative capacity to administer and deploy large numbers of new officers around the country. Lastly, the addition of 5,000 new officers by 2015 will lead to a considerable increase in budgetary requirements, which will need to be met by the Government and international donors.

22. During the reporting period, entry-level training of police cadets faced serious challenges. The twenty-third promotion began on 18 April with only 241 cadets, owing to a significant number of applicants failing the final medical screening. Concerned at the low intake, the national police extended the application deadline for the twenty-fourth promotion, allowing MINUSTAH to support a vigorous recruitment campaign conducted in police stations throughout Haiti. Consequently, 26,147 applicants, including 1,934 women, sat the written exams. On 23 July, the national police announced that 14,070 candidates, including 1,070 women, had passed the written exams and would be screened through physical and medical tests,

followed by interviews late in September. Furthermore, surplus successful candidates would be rostered for future promotions.

23. Progress in vetting police officers has been slow. To date, not a single officer has been dismissed as a result of the vetting exercise begun in 2006 by an integrated national police and MINUSTAH committee. Vetting centres have been established in 6 of the country's 10 departments, with the remaining 4 scheduled to be operational by January 2013. By July 2012, 1,034 new case files had been opened. On 14 May, background checks began for the cadets in the twenty-third promotion. Separately, 138 cases vetted before the earthquake were reviewed jointly with a high-level national police committee, which, in a final report submitted on 11 June, recommended the removal of 92 of the police officers reviewed. The Director General has submitted the names of 79 of those officers to the Minister of Justice and Public Security for his approval of their dismissal.

Protection of vulnerable groups

24. During the reporting period, and in close coordination with camp committees, MINUSTAH continued its community policing efforts in camps for the internally displaced, in particular in high-risk areas where women are vulnerable to sexual and gender-based violence. Of the remaining 575 sites, 5 high-risk and 2 medium-risk camps have been secured by a 24-hour security presence, 29 by a semi-permanent presence and approximately 70 non-permanent camps by daily patrols. The remaining sites are patrolled randomly. Beginning in April 2012, MINUSTAH police and military brought to an end their provision of 24-hour security in three camps: Acra Nord/Sud, Champs de Mars and Acra 238. The Mission handed over security responsibility for those camps to the national police, leaving only four locations secured by a 24-hour MINUSTAH security presence (Jean-Marie Vincent No. 1, Jean-Marie Vincent No. 2, Petionville Club and Corail). Further handover to the national police will continue, with only Jean-Marie Vincent, a high-risk camp, expected to require a permanent co-location with MINUSTAH presence in one year's time.

25. MINUSTAH led a joint working group, including UNICEF and the International Organization for Migration, in reviewing a bill on human trafficking that has been pending before Parliament since 2010. In recognition of the additional vulnerability faced by women in fragile communities, MINUSTAH continues to ensure that 30 per cent of the beneficiaries of each community violence reduction project are women (see below).

Community violence reduction

26. Under its programme to reduce community violence, MINUSTAH continued to conduct stabilization initiatives in fragile urban communities to tackle the persistent weakness of security institutions, socioeconomic challenges and political volatility. During the reporting period, it conducted large-scale labour-intensive projects, professional skills training, income-generating activities and psychosocial and awareness-raising initiatives, primarily targeting at-risk young people in urban areas. The Mission completed 63 projects from the budget for the period 2010-2011 and initiated another 57 projects, valued at $9 million, from the budget for the period 2011-2012, including 36 labour-intensive projects on watershed management, city infrastructure and canal rehabilitation that provide temporary employment for

51,000 at-risk young people, of whom 30 per cent are women, while also mitigating flood risks and improving urban sanitation for the wider community. In Port-au-Prince, Gonaïves and Cap-Haïtien, 1,300 young people (including women) are receiving income-generating support. The Mission continues to collaborate closely with its Haitian counterparts, in particular the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Youth, Sports and Civic Action, to build capacity with regard to measures to reduce violence. In addition, UNDP has provided technical and capacity-development support to strengthen the National Observatory on Violence and Crime, which is linked to the State University of Haiti.

Support to State institutions

27. MINUSTAH supported efforts by the elected municipal councils to finalize performance reports on their mandated period in office from 2006 to 2011, with 75 per cent of municipalities completing the exercise during the reporting period. This activity, aimed at institutionalizing a culture of accountability, was hampered by several factors, including political uncertainty caused by the replacement by presidential decree of more than 60 per cent of the country's 140 municipal councils whose term in office had expired in 2011 and the weakness of the internal management procedures of the Ministry of the Interior. The Mission and the Ministry participated jointly in planning and supervising the preparation of 140 municipal budgets for the fiscal year 2012-2013. In this challenging environment, MINUSTAH continued to support the Government's decentralization priorities at the central and departmental levels by reinforcing established local coordination mechanisms to identify locally driven solutions to security and conflict issues.

28. From 9 to 11 March, the Mission facilitated a parliamentary retreat for 52 parliamentarians representing all political affiliations with a view to encouraging debate on the Haitian anti-corruption legal framework between parliamentarians and institutions involved in efforts to combat corruption. The retreat culminated in the adoption of a declaration in which the legislature committed itself to approving pending anti-corruption legislation and to strengthening the autonomy of the Anti-Corruption Unit. To date, however, the difficulty in reaching a quorum in the Senate since 8 May has prevented the holding of a session to review and adopt the aforementioned bill.

Quick-impact projects

29. During the reporting period, MINUSTAH focused on funding and implementing quick-impact projects for earthquake-affected communities, while identifying projects in the following four priority areas defined by the Mission's leadership in September 2011: cholera mitigation; security lighting; road and infrastructure rehabilitation; and rule of law and education infrastructure (including schools and municipal and departmental public institutions). By mid-July, the Mission had fully allocated the quick-impact budget of $7.5 million for the period 2011-2012, covering 177 projects, and closed all 229 projects from the fiscal year 2010-2011. As at 15 July, the Mission had approved 36 projects representing 35.5 per cent of the $5 million budget for the fiscal year 2012-2013.

Justice

30. MINUSTAH and UNDP supported the Ministry of Justice and Public Security in devising a road map for rule of law reform. This included the organization in June of a national meeting, chaired by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, on the problem of excessive pretrial detention. MINUSTAH and UNDP continued to support the Ministry, including through the strengthening of the Judicial Inspectorate and the Ministry's planning unit. In particular, UNDP supported a capacity development assessment of the Ministry, which resulted in an action plan for its institutional reform. MINUSTAH and UNDP also supported the Superior Council of the Judiciary, whose functions include the administration of the judicial branch, the certification of certain magistrates before appointment and judicial discipline.

31. MINUSTAH approached external and international donors for the funding of the national legal aid programme. The support of UNDP in three regional pilot jurisdictions in Jacmel, Port-de-Paix and Fort-Liberté resulted in improved justice service delivery and decreased the levels of pretrial detention. UNDP and MINUSTAH jointly trained local magistrates, police officers and Prison Administration agents in investigation techniques and judicial identification in several regions. During the reporting period, MINUSTAH executed 17 quick-impact projects to construct and rehabilitate courts and provide them with office equipment. Meanwhile, 26 prefabricated units were installed for tribunals and civil registry offices throughout the country and the rehabilitation and equipping of the Institute of Forensic Medicine building was completed. The Mission also provided technical assistance in drafting a new legal basis for the Institute of Forensic Medicine. MINUSTAH and UNDP continued to provide technical assistance to the School of Magistrates, through which 20 magistrates who graduated from the initial training programme conducted in France were deployed to various jurisdictions as judges or prosecutors. The magistrates also benefited from an on-the-job training programme supported by UNDP, while MINUSTAH provided technical assistance to working groups preparing new criminal and criminal procedure codes.

Corrections

32. Notwithstanding the efforts to reduce the rate of illegal and prolonged pretrial detention by reviewing pending cases, which led to the release of numerous individuals, the growing number of new arrests has meant that the rate has remained high. As part of its programme aimed at improving correctional practices, MINUSTAH trained 105 Haitian corrections officers in the country's 16 prisons. The mentoring and training provided to medical personnel notwithstanding, inmate death rates increased significantly, primarily as a result of the resurgence of cholera and tuberculosis. A total of 69 deaths from various causes were reported for the first half of 2012, compared to an annual total of 43 in 2011. MINUSTAH is working closely with health partners and the Prison Administration leadership to enhance health services, although the absence of qualified staff remains a significant challenge. MINUSTAH corrections officers have also been embedded in the Office of the Ombudsman and in the internal investigations branch of the national police, so as to raise awareness and increase capacity for intervention within the prison environment, in an effort to ensure that appropriate action is taken in cases of negligence and serious human rights violations. Efforts continued to build the capacity of the prison registration system, enabling the identification and release of

prisoners irregularly detained. Following the endorsement of standard operating procedures for correctional facilities by the Haitian authorities, MINUSTAH is working with the Prison Administration on their implementation. MINUSTAH completed the installation in eight prisons of prefabricated facilities to be used as administrative offices and inmate classrooms. MINUSTAH has also provided technical support to the Prison Administration in the final phase of the opening of the Croix des Bouquets prison.

Human rights

33. The political stalemate and absence of a functioning Government in the early part of the reporting period constituted major obstacles to progress in the promotion and protection of human rights. The Mission maintained its focus on the investigation and reporting of human rights violations. In June 2012, it published a report on the inadequate response by the criminal justice sector to rape complaints filed in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area and issued recommendations on how victims of rape and other sexual crimes could better gain access to justice, which are also informing the Mission's engagement with the authorities. The limited efforts by the police and judiciary to investigate the killings that were the subject of public MINUSTAH reports in 2011 have not achieved significant results. Political will is needed to advance efforts to combat impunity, in particular following the controversial statement by the Haitian magistrate leading the investigation of former President Jean-Claude Duvalier that the statute of limitations blocked prosecution of the well-documented human rights crimes under the Duvalier regime. MINUSTAH continues to conduct capacity-building and awareness-raising activities throughout the country. It has established good working relations with the Minister with special responsibility for promoting human rights and combating extreme poverty and has also provided assistance to the Office of the Ombudsman to prepare a law consistent with the Principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights (the Paris Principles). The law was adopted by Parliament in May and is awaiting promulgation by the President. MINUSTAH continues to advocate adequate financial support for the Office from the State, especially to ensure a country-wide presence.

Gender

34. The Mission provided support to the Ministry of Women's Affairs and Women's Rights in running safe spaces for survivors of sexual and gender-based violence established in three camps for internally displaced persons, in addition to coordinating the creation of similar spaces in seven national police stations. The Mission, in collaboration with the International Organization for Migration, organized 28 training sessions for national police officers on police response to sexual and gender-based violence, in addition to 27 training sessions for Haitian legal professionals on legal recourse for victims of sexual violence. MINUSTAH held a five-day training-of-trainers session for 30 community leaders (20 women and 10 men) as part of a "zero violence" platform to support the establishment of community networks to raise awareness of how to prevent sexual and gender-based violence. The Mission supported advocacy campaigns that led to the adoption of the above-mentioned constitutional amendment providing for a quota of at least 30 per cent women's participation in public decision-making. Support was also provided to women's networks for the organization of 360 training and awareness-raising

workshops that culminated in the adoption of a national platform of action for women and their communities that was officially submitted to the President by representatives of women's organizations.

Child protection

35. During the reporting period, MINUSTAH received reports of violations of children's rights, including 128 cases of rape, 6 cases of kidnapping, 5 cases of child trafficking, 7 cases of homicide and 3 cases in which children were shot and injured, frequently during shoot-outs between rival gangs. The reports are shared weekly with the national police Brigade for the Protection of Minors for follow-up. Concerning child trafficking, MINUSTAH briefed civilian agents of the Brigade and local communities against smuggling and trafficking of children at border posts with the Dominican Republic and established a hotline hosted by the Brigade to report child trafficking and other offences against children. After sustained advocacy by MINUSTAH and the juvenile justice sectoral group led by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security with the support of UNICEF, the juvenile court resumed hearings in June 2012 and has been processing most pending cases, 82 per cent of which involve minors in pretrial detention. Following advocacy by MINUSTAH in cooperation with UNICEF and other stakeholders, on 11 June, Parliament ratified the Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in respect of Intercountry Adoption.

HIV/AIDS

36. Through a joint United Nations team on AIDS, 11 United Nations agencies continued to conduct HIV prevention awareness-raising activities and an anti-stigma campaign throughout Haiti. The joint team is working closely with the First Lady of Haiti, Sophia Martelly, to implement a year-long advocacy and communication campaign to eliminate mother-to-child transmission. To reach young people, United Nations agencies have partnered with civil society organizations and have integrated HIV prevention education into conferences and training workshops on leadership, gender, human rights and women's rights. In the area of governance, the joint team assisted the Government in the reform of the Haiti Country Coordinating Mechanism for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, resulting in continued funding of $34 million for HIV prevention. Notwithstanding a decrease in the HIV prevalence rate in Haiti over the past five years and the fact that the latest statistics show an adult HIV prevalence rate of 1.9 per cent, the country continues to have one of the highest HIV prevalence rates in the world.

Conduct and discipline

37. The Conduct and Discipline Unit delivered 62 training sessions for 1,368 MINUSTAH personnel. In consultation with senior civilian, military and police managers, the Mission developed an integrated strategy to enhance accountability by Mission leaders aimed at preventing misconduct. The strategy led to a strengthened focal point network and an increase in reporting by personnel owing to enhanced awareness of their obligations.

38. An increase in thefts of high-value property and equipment was noted. The Mission has stepped up security at key locations and has received extensive assistance from the Haitian authorities in investigating the thefts. The Mission and

the Government are cooperating to ensure that those responsible are brought to justice and, to the extent possible, that the stolen property and equipment are recovered.

Safety and security of United Nations personnel

39. The most significant risks facing the United Nations in Haiti come from opportunistic crime (which is sometimes violent), civil unrest focused on local issues, road traffic accidents and natural disasters. To help to manage the risks and to enable United Nations activities, the United Nations Security Section consolidated its capacity and training in crisis alert and response, forming an operations and response unit and expanding its search and rescue capability. It also improved its security information management processes, creating a unified database of all United Nations personnel working in Haiti, including agencies, funds and programmes. It also increased cooperation and coordination on security management issues with the host Government, especially regarding official procedures for the investigation of theft of or damage to United Nations property.

Public information and outreach

40. During the reporting period, MINUSTAH continued to use public information as a strategic tool to support the implementation of its mandate. Public information efforts continued through international and national media relations and regular press conferences, in addition to timely issuance of press releases and other products, including through the Mission's radio, website, social media and television productions. Radio MINUSTAH FM continued providing support to efforts to prevent cholera, ensure disaster and hurricane preparedness, and promote national reconciliation and the rule of law. In close coordination with other MINUSTAH components and United Nations agencies, the Mission produced its weekly 15-minute video programme on topics of interest to the Haitian public concerning its work and current affairs, which is broadcast on seven national television stations and eight diaspora television stations in the United States of America, in addition to being disseminated by the nine multimedia centres in the regions.

Mission support

41. MINUSTAH finalized its review of the Santo Domingo Support Office as a back office for administrative support. Implementation of the recommendations is in progress and will result in a reduction in operational expenses of the Office and a further nationalization of staffing positions. The United Nations and the Government of the Dominican Republic are continuing to work on the elaboration of a memorandum of understanding concerning support for MINUSTAH with a view to further reducing the financial impact on the Mission.

V. Humanitarian, recovery and development activities

Coordination between the Mission and the United Nations country team

42. During the reporting period, MINUSTAH and the United Nations country team finalized the draft of the new integrated strategic framework for the period 2013-2016, which identifies United Nations priorities and is aligned with the

Government's strategic development plan. The new framework has been drafted in close consultation with the Government and addresses a new context of transition, dominated by two broad trends: the shared commitment of the Government and of international partners to focus on strengthening Haitian institutions to fully manage the delivery of basic social services; and the gradual downsizing of the Mission's presence. The number of joint programmes involving at least two United Nations agencies and the Government, which are managed by the United Nations country team, has increased to a total of 11, 6 of which are funded through the Haiti Reconstruction Fund. In June 2012, actual funding of joint programmes stood at $184 million of a total required budget of $274 million.

43. The Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General and United Nations Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator, in his capacity as Chair of the Group of Twelve (the group of main donors in Haiti), and in collaboration with UNDP, worked with the Government to develop a new aid coordination framework that was endorsed by the Government Council (comprising all Cabinet ministers and headed by the Prime Minister). The framework is pending approval by the Council of Ministers, which is chaired by the President. It replaces the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission, whose mandate expired in October 2011, and comes under the auspices of the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation. It is intended to help the Government to ensure increased transparency in foreign aid transactions and to strengthen the Government's capacity to manage external resources. Similarly, a cluster system transition plan is being developed. Following the deactivation, on 30 June, of several humanitarian clusters in favour of nationally led coordination mechanisms, only four critical clusters remain (camp coordination and camp management/shelter; health; water, sanitation and hygiene; and protection). Those clusters will be maintained until the end of 2012, while support is redirected from clusters to counterpart Haitian institutions.

44. Since 2010, a top priority of MINUSTAH and the United Nations country team has been the institutional strengthening of governance at the national and local levels. To this end, United Nations agencies, programmes and funds currently have a total of 835 staff (693 national staff and 142 international staff) deployed in national and local government entities in order to strengthen institutional capacity and provide technical assistance.

United Nations efforts with regard to the cholera epidemic

45. According to the Ministry of Public Health and Population, the cholera epidemic has caused more than 7,440 deaths. A total of 580,947 people were infected during the period from October 2010 to 15 July 2012. From 1 January to 1 August 2012, the Ministry's monitoring and alert system recorded more than 35,000 new cases. A binational initiative to eliminate cholera from the island of Hispaniola was launched in January 2012. Under the leadership of the Ministry of Public Health and Population, Government institutions, the World Health Organization, UNICEF and other key actors are developing a strategic plan for the period 2013-2022, with a special focus on the coming two years. The system remains weak and underreports cases, however. With the onset of the rainy season early in March, the number of new cholera cases increased, although the case fatality rate has remained constant at 1.3 per cent. The World Health Organization projects a possible 112,000 cases in 2012. The United Nations and partners have supported the establishment, upgrading and maintenance of oral rehydration points

and cholera treatment units and centres, in addition to developing guidance on surveillance, case management, containment and case referral. The National Directorate for Water and Sanitation was supported to respond to cholera spikes and distribute household water treatment products to more than 30,000 families. The United Nations and partners have also supported prevention, including through community-level outreach to 700,000 families and by positioning 2 million household water treatment products nationwide. The resurgence of the cholera outbreak is particularly worrying, however, since non-governmental organizations that responded at the beginning of the epidemic are phasing out their support for lack of funding. Consequently, support for the transfer of responsibilities to the Ministry of Public Health and Population, as foreseen in the national strategy, has decreased, as has the capacity to treat cholera cases effectively. The integration of efforts to combat cholera into the national health system is experiencing significant challenges, in part caused by delays in the decentralization of response efforts and structural weaknesses within the health system. The Ministry of Public Health and Population and partners are taking measures to introduce necessary improvements.

Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti

46. In support of the Government, the Office of the Special Envoy is continuing its work with the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General and United Nations Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator, the United Nations country team and donors on the implementation of the accompaniment approach, which sets forth practical implementation principles that ask donors and their partners to channel more funding to local public and private institutions to help to promote access to services and jobs for the most vulnerable. While such principles are not new and are reflected in the global aid effectiveness agenda, a careful analysis of funding flows makes clear that there remains significant work to be done in the implementation of the principles. For example, of the $5.78 billion disbursed by bilateral and multilateral donors to Haiti for recovery, humanitarian and development efforts from 2010 to 2012, an estimated 10 per cent ($556 million) has been disbursed to the Government through its own systems. In this regard, the Office of the Special Envoy is partnering with the Peacebuilding Support Office and the Overseas Development Institute on a new research project examining lessons learned in the delivery of aid to Haiti. The project will culminate in an end-of-year report comparing the way in which aid is delivered in Haiti to that in other fragile settings and making recommendations on how delivery can be improved in such contexts. The Office of the Special Envoy is also supporting UNDP work with the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation on establishing a comprehensive aid information management system, which will be an integral part of the aid coordination framework outlined above.

VI. Outline of a reconfiguration and consolidation plan for the Mission

47. As Haiti is once again setting its sights on longer-term stabilization and development goals and has made important strides in strengthening its political and rule of law institutions, MINUSTAH has continued to draw down its post-earthquake surge and has further reduced activities linked to the challenges caused by the earthquake. To ensure that the Mission continues to adjust to these evolving

conditions, at my request, my Special Representative, in collaboration with the United Nations country team, has consulted the Government and international partners on a plan for a reconfiguration and conditions-based consolidation of MINUSTAH. The Mission intends to continue developing this plan and to review and adjust it periodically as circumstances require.

48. The plan foresees a narrowing of the Mission's activities to a core set of mandated tasks that are achievable within a reasonable time frame (envisioned to be a period of between four and five years for planning purposes) aimed at consolidating stabilization gains to a point beyond which the presence of a large peacekeeping operation will no longer be required. The Mission will work with the Government, civil society, the United Nations country team and international partners to agree on a transition compact that will set out a limited number of stabilization benchmarks that will serve as key indicators of progress in the stabilization process. On security, the level of operational effectiveness of the national police will constitute the main benchmark that should guide the pace of the drawdown of the Mission's uniformed personnel. Other benchmarks will evaluate the maturity of key rule of law oversight and accountability mechanisms, which are fundamental in firmly rooting a culture of rule of law, in addition to the status of related legislative and regulatory frameworks. The capacity of Haitian institutions to organize and coordinate transparent, fair and credible elections with limited external assistance will guide the reduction of elections-related tasks by MINUSTAH.

49. The Mission's consolidation proposals assume that its military component will gradually hand over responsibility for security to formed police units and, ultimately, to the national police as the latter's numbers and capacity grow. The transfer from military to formed police units is already completed in 4 of the 10 departments (South, Grand-Anse, Nippes and North-West). By July 2013, MINUSTAH intends to concentrate its military presence into five security hubs (Port-au-Prince, Léogâne, Gonaïves, Cap-Haïtien and Ouanaminthe). This gradual concentration of the military presence would be balanced by the deployment of formed police units to the vacated departments, a transition model that has already proved effective. In partnership with MINUSTAH police, the military component will also explore ways to contribute to the mentoring and training of the national police, such as in the area of maritime security.

50. I therefore recommend that the Security Council consider reducing the Mission's authorized military strength from 7,340 to 6,270 troops through a balanced withdrawal of 1,070 infantry and engineering personnel by June 2013. Furthermore, as the Mission further concentrates its efforts on national police mentoring and development, phases out operational policing activities by its individual police officers and rationalizes its police component structure, I recommend a reduction of the authorized police strength from 3,241 to 2,601 personnel by June 2013, which will be attained by the withdrawal of 400 individual officers by early 2013 and a reduction in the number of formed police units to 10 by June 2013. Those reductions would coincide with current troop and police rotation schedules and may also take into account the calendar for the upcoming partial legislative, municipal and local elections.

51. The Mission will also restructure its civilian components to reflect the reduced scope of its activities. As a first step, MINUSTAH will concentrate all support functions for its presence in the 10 departments into four regional hubs. It will also

seek to strengthen programmatic ties and co-locate wherever possible with the country team, giving the latter the opportunity to further decentralize its presence throughout Haiti and to plan for the gradual drawdown of the peacekeeping operation. Given the anticipated drop in donor funding for the United Nations country team programmes, the Mission will assist in the development of a resource mobilization strategy.

VII. Financial aspects

52. By its resolution 66/273, the General Assembly appropriated the amount of $648,394,000 for the maintenance of MINUSTAH for the period from 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013. Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of MINUSTAH beyond 15 October 2012, the cost of maintaining the Mission will be limited to the amounts approved by the General Assembly.

53. As at 21 August 2012, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for MINUSTAH amounted to $162.5 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to $3,470.8 million.

54. As at 21 August 2012, amounts owed to troop and formed police unit contributors to MINUSTAH totalled $20.5 million. Reimbursement of troop and contingent-owned equipment costs have been made for the periods up to 31 May 2012 and 31 March 2012, respectively, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

VIII. Observations

55. The swearing-in of a new Government, the publication of a corrected version of the constitutional amendments and the establishment of the Superior Council of the Judiciary are important milestones in Haiti's efforts to strengthen its democratic and rule of law institutions. The steps already taken by the new Government to attract foreign investment, combat corruption and smuggling and promote industrial projects aimed at creating jobs are indicators of a genuine desire to move forward with socioeconomic development. Those measures had long been expected by the Haitian electorate and I commend the country's authorities for displaying leadership and forging the necessary compromises to achieve such results.

56. Government measures to dislodge elements of the former armed forces and new recruits who had been illegally occupying sites throughout the country averted a challenge to law and order and demonstrated an encouraging improvement in the response capacity of the national police. I encourage the Government to follow through on its promises to make final payments of severance arrears to eligible members of the former armed forces.

57. The political process in Haiti remains vulnerable to setbacks linked to political instability, lack of respect for the rule of law and unmet social grievances. In this context, I urge the new Government to do its utmost to continue to strengthen the country's rule of law institutions and to redouble its efforts to combat unemployment and poverty. I encourage Haitian political actors to engage in the elaboration of a consensual legislative agenda that promotes institution-building,

safeguards investment, protects human rights and puts an end to a culture of impunity.

58. The constitutional amendments published in June have finally provided the basis for the establishment of the Permanent Electoral Council, the absence of which has been detrimental to political stability in recent years. It is of paramount importance that the Council be constituted and operate with the utmost integrity and the support of all institutions. In this regard, I encourage all stakeholders to engage in a constructive dialogue to allow for the holding of credible and long-overdue elections, which will help to revitalize Haitian institutions and minimize the institutional vacuum following the end of the terms of 10 senators on 8 May. It is particularly important that the Government mobilize its share of resources for the electoral budget, including the funding required to build the management and administrative capabilities of the Permanent Electoral Council. As before, the United Nations stands ready to support the electoral process.

59. In the light of the progress achieved in recent months, I am optimistic that Haiti's leaders have an opportunity to make genuine progress in rebuilding the nation, strengthening institutions, attracting investment, promoting sustainable development and entrenching respect for the rule of law and human rights. Reiterating my intention to continue to consolidate the presence of MINUSTAH, I recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of the Mission for an additional year, until 15 October 2013, while incorporating the adjustments recommended in paragraphs 47 to 51 of the present report.

60. The strengthening of the national police remains a key prerequisite for the Mission's eventual withdrawal from Haiti. I welcome the President's stated intention to focus on the continued strengthening of this institution so that it can provide security throughout Haiti. Recent steps by the Government, with the Mission's assistance, to increase the numbers of police recruits, in particular female recruits, are encouraging and should help to accelerate the currently insufficient intake of new police cadets. To ensure the continued and sustainable growth of the national police, I invite the Government to address with greater focus the strengthening of the institution's administrative capacity and to reinforce its middle-level and senior officer ranks. In this context, I urge the Government and Member States to commit themselves to ensuring that the needed funding is made available to support a professional, reliable and accountable police force.

61. I should like to conclude by expressing my sincere gratitude to my Special Representative, Mariano Fernández, to my Special Envoy, the former President of the United States, William J. Clinton, and to the men and women of MINUSTAH, troop-contributing countries, police-contributing countries and the United Nations country team and its partners for their continued dedication and commitment in support of stability and development in Haiti.

Annex I

United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti: countries providing military staff and contingents, as at 15 August 2012

	Staff officers		*Troops*		
Country	*Females*	*Males*	*Females*	*Males*	*Total*
Argentina		12	49	662	723
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	1	2	11	195	209
Brazil		19	21	1 856[a]	1 896[b]
Canada	1	4			5
Chile		3	13	484	500
Ecuador		1	1	65	67
France		3			3
Guatemala		5	10	123	138
Indonesia		1		167	168
Japan		2	2	212	216
Jordan		8		242	250
Nepal		12	8	342	362
Paraguay		1		159	160
Peru		6	8	358	372
Philippines		2	11	144	157
Republic of Korea		2	4	236	242
Sri Lanka		11		850	861
United States of America		9			9
Uruguay		12	37	885	934
Total	**2**	**115**	**175**	**6 980**	**7 272**

[a] Including one Bolivian attached to the Brazilian contingent.

[b] The Force Commander is employed on a United Nations contract and hence not reflected in the troop strength.

[c] In its resolution 2012 (2011), the Security Council decided that the Mission's overall force levels would consist of up to 7,340 troops of all ranks.

Annex II

United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti: countries providing police and formed police units, as at 17 August 2012

Country	Number of United Nations police		Number of formed police units	
	Female	Male	Female	Male
Argentina	2	15	–	–
Bangladesh	–	10	106	214
Benin	–	36	–	–
Brazil	–	2	–	–
Burkina Faso	29	53	–	–
Burundi	10	30	–	–
Cameroon	5	51	–	–
Canada	7	51	–	–
Central African Republic	1	3	–	–
Chad	1	8	–	–
Chile	3	8	–	–
China	–	16	–	–
Colombia	3	22	–	–
Côte d'Ivoire	12	110	–	–
Croatia	–	5	–	–
Egypt	–	31	–	–
El Salvador	4	12	–	–
France	3	31	–	–
Grenada	–	–	–	–
Guinea	1	15	–	–
Guinea-Bissau	–	–	–	–
India	2	1	–	460
Indonesia	1	9	–	–
Italy	–	–	–	–
Jamaica	–	1	–	–
Jordan	–	41	–	320
Kyrgyzstan	–	1	–	–
Lithuania	–	–	–	–
Madagascar	1	3	–	–
Mali	2	27	–	–
Nepal	–	16	10	130
Niger	14	68	–	–
Nigeria	1	7	–	–
Norway	2	4	–	–

	Number of United Nations police		*Number of formed police units*	
Country	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*
Pakistan	–	13	–	140
Philippines	1	29	–	–
Romania	1	16	–	–
Russian Federation	1	2	–	–
Rwanda	11	25	9	151
Senegal	2	17	–	140
Serbia	–	5	–	–
Sierra Leone	1	3	–	–
Spain	2	21	–	–
Sri Lanka	2	28	–	–
Sweden	1	1	–	–
Togo	–	1	–	–
Turkey	2	25	–	–
Thailand	6	9	–	–
United States of America	14	79	–	–
Uruguay	2	2	–	–
Yemen	–	18	–	–
	150	**977**	**125**	**1 555**
Subtotal	**1 127**		**1 680**	
Total	**2 807**[a]			

[a] In its resolution 2012 (2011), the Security Council decided that the Mission would have a police component of 3,241 officers.